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ABSTRACT 
 
The quality of corporate governance and risk management is one of the main determinants of firm 
performance during economic downturns. The global financial crisis of 2007–08 reduced the global market 
capitalization by approx. 50%, making it one of the most acute financial crises. Only a few studies have 
investigated the direct impact of financial derivatives usage and earnings management simultaneously on 
market performance for non-financial firms during this period. These studies report mixed results on the 
phenomenon varying based on the sample and the empirical methodology used.  
 
This study aims to identify the effect of the two income smoothing techniques on the market performance 
of non-financial firms during the global financial crisis. It uses a binary variable indicating the use of 
financial derivatives and the absolute amount of discretionary accruals during a specific year as the main 
independent variables, while firm performance is measured by a novel variable - the cumulative monthly 
stock returns during the year. The sample includes 297 firms listed on the S&P 500 index between 2005 
and 2009, which allows comparison of results observed during the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. 
In addition to Pooled OLS, fixed-effects models are used in the regression analysis. 
 
The empirical findings suggest that using financial derivatives has a positive impact on firm performance, 
while the magnitude of discretionary accruals has a negative impact. These relationships are stronger during 
the crisis period, especially for larger firms and firms with more independent boards. Although the results 
are robust and of significance to academics as well as practitioners, further research using a larger sample 
and a longer time horizon may enhance their validity and address any potential endogeneity bias. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEY WORDS: Derivatives, Earnings Management, Firm Performance, Financial Crisis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007–08, often recognized as the most acute financial crisis 
since the great depression of the 1930s, resulted in a decline of over 50% in the global 
stock market capitalization. Although the financial sector was most affected by the crisis, 
non-financial sectors around the world also experienced the impacts up to a great extent. 
(Clarke, 2010; Kirkpatrick 2009.) During the crisis, uncertainty and risk related to the 
reliability of public corporate information, were higher than before (Lin, Jiang, Tang & 
He 2014). Kirkpatrick (2009), in an article discussing the relevance of corporate 
governance during the financial crisis, concluded that the quality of corporate governance 
and risk management in a non-financial firm is a significant determinant of firm 
performance in chaotic times. Several other papers have studied the impact of corporate 
governance quality on firm performance during the financial crisis of the late 2000s, but 
only a few have focused directly on the issues of earnings management and hedging. 
Further, the association between risk management activities and firm performance during 
the period comprising the global financial crisis has mostly been studied using a sample 
of financial firms.  
 
 
1.1. Background and Basis for Research 
 
Mixed results have been reported by previous studies on the relationship between hedging 
using financial derivatives and firm performance. Panaretou (2014) finds a positive 
relationship between using foreign currency derivatives and firm performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q for a sample of non-financial firms listed in the United Kingdom during 
2003-2010. However, the author reports a lower hedging premium for firms during 2007-
2010. On the other hand, Bartram, Brown, & Conrad (2011), using a global sample of 
firms from 47 different countries, find that hedgers had significantly lower systematic 
risk during the crisis period of 1998-2002. But, they only find weak results for higher 
alphas for hedgers during the period, although hedgers had a significantly lower drop in 
Return on Assets during the period compared to non-hedgers. After further analysis of 
the impact of derivatives use on firm value, they conclude that the benefits of using 
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derivatives to hedge financial risk are higher during times of economic distress. In an 
influential study conducted by Allayannis & Weston (2001) on the impact of foreign 
currency derivatives usage on firm value in non-financial U.S. firms, they find a hedging 
premium of up to approx. 5 % of firm value during the period 1990-1995. Another paper, 
by Nelson, Moffitt & Affleck-Graves (2005), shows similar results concerning the impact 
of foreign currency derivatives usage and firm performance. This study uses abnormal 
stock returns of U.S. non-financial firms during the period of 1995–1999 and reports a 
4.3 % hedging premium for foreign currency hedgers per year, but no premium for 
interest-rate and a negative impact of commodity derivatives users. Yin & Jorion (2006) 
perform a similar study using a sample of oil & gas firms from the United States during 
1998–2001. Interestingly, they find that hedgers’ stocks exhibit lower sensitivity to oil & 
gas prices, but do not have earn a hedging premium relative to non-hedgers.  
 
The consequences of earnings management on firm performance have been researched 
heavily in the last few decades, especially after a few major accounting scandals. Dechow, 
Weili & Schrand (2010), taking into consideration the previous literature on the impact 
of earnings quality on firm value, conclude that investors react negatively to financial 
misstatements by firms. Xing & Yan (2018), studying the association between systematic 
risk and the quality of accounting information in U.S. firms, find that firms with high 
quality of accounting information exhibited lower systematic risk. Aldamen, Keith, Kelly, 
Mcnamara & Nagel (2011) state that audit committees have a primary role in overseeing 
the risk management and earnings management practices of firms. In their paper, they use 
the characteristics of audit committees as proxies for the quality of earnings and the 
quality of risk management practices of a sample of U.S. firms during 2008–2009 and 
attempt to find their relationship with firm performance during the global financial crisis 
period. They find that firms the size of audit committee has a negative effect on firm 
performance. They also find a positive impact of the financial expertise and experience 
of the audit committee members and firm performance during the crisis period. They use 
the change in share price as the measure of firm performance. Most papers on this subject 
use indirect measures of earnings management and risk management practices to find 
their impact on non-financial firms’ performance during 2008–2009. However, the paper 
by Lin et. al (2014) discussed the relationship between financial reporting quality, 
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measured by the amount of discretionary accruals, and firm performance of non-financial 
companies from the United Kingdom between 2008–2009. The authors find that firms 
with a higher quality of earnings had higher stock liquidity during the crisis. They state 
that the lower trust and higher information risk during the period could have been reduced 
by enhancing the transparency of financial performance of firms, and the firms that 
undertook the related steps suffered the less consequences.  
 
Attia (2012), investigating the relationship between artificial and real income smoothing, 
find evidence using a sample of non-financial firms from the United States during 1993-
2004 that the two smoothing devices are used together in order to achieve an efficient risk 
management strategy. Barton (2001) also finds that discretionary accruals and derivatives 
are used as partial substitutes to achieve a desirable volatility in the firm earnings, which 
helps managers gain value for private gains while also avoiding additional interest and 
tax related costs. However, Choi, Mao & Upadhyay (2015), following Barton (2011), 
perform a similar study during 1996-2006, and find contrary results. The authors report a 
complementary relationship between the two income smoothing techniques after the 
introduction of FAS 133 in 1998, which made it mandatory for listed firms in the United 
States to report the fair market value of their outstanding derivatives and to recognize the 
ineffective part of cash flow hedges immediately, giving rise to the belief that hedging 
using financial derivatives had become inefficient (Choi et al. (2015).  
 
Based on the previous literature discussed above, it can be concluded that mixed results 
have been found for the impact of artificial and income smoothing on firm performance. 
However, the evident relationship between the two smoothing devices makes it important 
to study the simultaneous effect of the two techniques on firm performance, especially 
during a time of market uncertainty. Considering that the primary objective of hedging is 
to avoid losses due to unforeseeable changes in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and 
commodity prices, it would be beneficial to study the effect of hedging practices of firms 
on their performance during a financial crisis, which is an exogenous shock for non-
financial firms. Also, as mentioned earlier, due to increased uncertainty and information 
risk during a crisis, and the widely found significance of financial reporting quality for 
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firm value, the direct impact of prevalent earnings management on firm performance 
during the crisis is an important subject.   
 
 
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
 
This study would fill in this gap in the existing literature contribute to the research 
community by using direct proxies for earnings management and hedging practices of 
non-financial U.S. firms as explanatory variables and compounded monthly stock returns 
during the period as the dependent variable. To proxy for hedging, a binary variable 
indicating whether a firm uses financial derivatives to hedge financial risk or not will be 
used. The absolute amount of discretionary accruals for a firm during a given year will 
be used as a proxy for earnings quality. Healy (1985) defines discretionary accruals as 
the adjustments made by a manager of a firm to its cash flows in order to modify the 
timing of reported income and expenses. Overall, the aim of this thesis is to identify the 
simultaneous impact of artificial and real income smoothing on firm performance during 
the period 2005-2009, with an emphasis on the period representing the global financial 
crisis (2008-2009). The study uses a sample of non-financial and non-utility firms listed 
on the S&P 500 stock index during the whole sample period. Various quantitative 
analytical methods are used to answer the primary research question, which is: Does the 
use of financial derivatives and discretionary accruals have an impact on firm 
performance during an economic downturn? The role of corporate governance in the 
relationship between income smoothing devices and firm performance will also be 
explored. Since endogeneity-related issues have been highlighted in previous similar 
studies, measures including fixed-effects regression models have been utilized to achieve 
reliable results. However, due to a limited data set and resources, endogeneity effects 
could not be elimited completely and may be present up to some extent. 
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1.3. Thesis Structure 
 
This study is divided into six different chapters, with the first chapter serving as an 
introduction to the subject of the research. It also describes the motivation behind the 
study based on the empirical and theoretical background information. The second chapter 
lays down the theoretical foundations, discussing the importance of accounting 
information quality, the factors influencing earnings management and the use of financial 
derivatives for hedging purposes, as well as the consequences of management choices 
concerning risk management. The third chapter discusses in length previous studies 
investigating similar relationships and forms research hypotheses based thereon. The 
fourth chapter focuses on the research methodology applied in this study by describing 
the data and the empirical methods used. The fifth chapter compares the results obtained 
in this study by using the respective analytical models with previous literature. The last 
chapter forms conclusions based on the results and includes suggestions for further 
research. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter lays down the theoretical foundations for this study. The different sections 
in the chapter deal with specific aspects of this study, including the quality of reported 
financial information, accrual and earnings management, financial risk and hedging, and 
rationales for using financial derivatives for hedging purposes.  
 
 
2.1. Financial Accounting Information 
 
Financial accounting information disclosed by a public firm is the result of the firm’s 
fundamental performance, its internal accounting practices, and the respective external 
accounting information reporting systems, such as the International Financial Reporting 
Standards. This information gives the stakeholders a comprehensive picture of a firm’s 
financial performance during a specific period as well as its current financial position, 
and is the basis for various economic decisions. For instance, managerial compensation 
plans in public firms are commonly tied, in part, to an accounting performance measure 
or a public performance measure. The effect of accounting performance on a firm’s stock 
price, which is one of the public performance measures, is widely documented. Also, the 
relationship between managerial compensation plans and management turnover, and 
subsequently the association between management turnover and a firm’s stock 
performance is also evident from previous governance research. (Bushman & Smith 
2001; Dechow, Ge & Schrand 2010.) Thus, the role of accounting information is vital in 
the current corporate environment.  
 
All publicly listed firms in the United States are required to publish financial statements 
on a quarterly and annual basis. According to Elliott and Elliott (2006), financial 
statements portray the financial consequences of past transactions and group them into 
certain categories based on the type of effect they entail on the organization. In order to 
ensure that the accounting information publicly disclosed by a firm is of high quality, 
various external control mechanisms have been put in place. In the United States of 
America, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the main body of control over 
15 
 
the financial and accounting practices of publicly listed firms. The SEC is responsible for 
monitoring the reporting standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
and the implementation of the established rules by public firms in their financial 
statements. Stakeholders of a firm are often interested in the firm’s published balance 
sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, and the statement of changes in equity, 
supplemented with notes that clarify accounting policies and derivation of accounting 
figures. Public firms are required to conform to the applicable accounting standards when 
making these statements, and are subject to regular audits by external auditing entities. 
(Imhoff 2003.) Firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ are also 
required to have a board of directors majorly composed of outside (or independent) 
members, consistent with the theory that having more independent board directors 
enhances the control over management’s financial accounting and reporting practices 
(Huang, Louwers, Moffitt & Zhang 2008). Accounting standards and external auditors 
assist managers in communicating with their stakeholders by allowing them to report their 
past financial performance and related future transactions in a reliable and consistent 
manner (Healy and Wahlen 1999).  
 
 
2.2. Accrual Accounting and Earnings Management  
 
Most corporations use cash accounting or accrual accounting in order to prepare their 
financial statements. While small companies may qualify for using cash accounting, 
publicly listed firms are required to use accrual accounting while preparing their financial 
statements. Under cash accounting, a firm records an economic transaction when a cash 
flow occurs, whereas under accrual accounting, the transaction is recorded when the 
exchange of goods or services takes place and not when the cash is paid or received. 
Hence, accruals are revenues that have been recorded but not yet been earned, and 
expenses that have incurred but not yet been recorded. (Duchac, Reeve & Warren 2010.) 
The use of accrual accounting does not only inform a firm’s stakeholders of the past cash 
revenues and expenses, but also of the future payment obligations and the expected cash 
in-flows from a transaction or an asset (Elliott & Elliott 2006). Financial statement items, 
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such as, inventories, depreciation, accounts receivables, employee benefit-related 
expenses, bad debt reserves, etc. are commonly affected by the use of accruals.  
 
Quality of Financial Information 
 
Financial information quality is a broad concept, where different academics and standard 
setters have different measures to evaluate the usefulness of the information. However, 
Elliott and Elliott (2006) explain that the basic qualitative features of useful accounting 
information are reliability, relevance, comparability, and understandability. Briefly, 
financial accounting information should be of some economic significance, be complete 
and free from bias, be consistent, and be perceivable by its users, which include investors, 
customers, suppliers, employees, the government, standard setters, and creditors. Various 
studies have suggested the fixation of financial market participants with a company’s 
bottom-line figure, the earnings (Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh & Lakonishok 2006). 
Consequently, there has been extensive research done on the effects of earnings quality.  
 
A meta-analysis study by Bilal, Chen & Komal (2018) mentioned that researchers use 
different proxies of earnings quality, such as, the quality of accruals, real earnings 
management, target beating, earnings restatement, and the strength of internal controls. 
Accruals quality is connected with the discretion used by managers in creating provisions 
and estimates that do not directly affect present cash flows, but influence the bottom-line 
earnings figure, whereas real earnings management is the strategic timing of corporate 
decisions that directly impact the firm’s cash flows. Target beating is the deliberate 
upward manipulation of earnings and downward direction of analyst estimates by 
managers in order to control market reaction. Akhigbe, Kudla & Madura (2007) define 
earnings restatement as the process of adjusting previously published accounting 
information, which may require a reassessment of the firm’s future cash flows. Internal 
controls comprise of the measures taken by a firm to ensure the accuracy and reliability 
of accounting practices, and can be associated with the independence of the board 
members, expertise of the audit committee, and the type of relationship with the external 
auditing firm. (Bilal, Chen & Komal 2018.) According to Dechow, Ge & Schrand (2010), 
previous literature on proxies of earnings quality does not indicate the superiority of any 
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specific quality measure. The authors further state that the quality of earnings depends on 
the type of decision that is to be subsequently made.  
 
Earnings Management 
 
Corporate managers have a good knowledge of their firm’s past performance as well as 
the underlying micro- and macro-factors that affect the business and the industry it 
operates in. They should hence be given an opportunity to use their judgement in 
producing estimates for the financial reports. Indeed, even while conforming to the rules 
and standards set by accounting standards such as the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) or the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), managers 
do have some discretion while preparing the financial statements. Managers are required 
to use their judgement for various corporate decisions, such as the expected life of fixed 
assets, the value of current inventory, expected bad debts, and future human resources-
related costs. The need for managerial discretion arises from the available choice of 
accounting methods that affect the firm’s financials. For instance, managers can choose 
whether to employ a straight-line depreciation method or an accelerated depreciation 
method when valuing fixed assets. They also have various choices concerning inventory 
valuation and receivables policy. Healy and Wahlen (1999) report that accounting 
discretion is an opportunity for managers to provide external stakeholders with credible 
private information that may otherwise be limited by accounting standards. However, due 
to monitoring and auditing inefficiency, management discretion may be misused for 
personal gains. (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 2000.) 
 
Jensen (1994) mentions that human beings, by nature, are self-interested, and managerial 
compensation in the form of equity and stock options, or performance-based 
compensation contracts, may provide managers with the incentives to engage in activities 
not in line with shareholder welfare. One such unethical practice by corporate managers 
is earnings management. Sevin and Schroeder (2005) define earnings management as 
the deliberate effort by corporate managers to influence short-term earnings reported in 
financial statements. Healy and Wahlen (1999) elaborate on the definition of earnings 
management by claiming that managers indulge in this practice either to mislead 
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stakeholders or to affect the contractual consequences of reported earnings. Referring to 
previous studies, Sevin and Schroeder (2005) explain that managers may be motivated to 
manage earnings using unethical practices in order to influence the stock price, increase 
their performance-based compensation, and maintain or enhance creditor relations, etc. 
According to them, managers face pressures to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts 
due to their belief that investors and creditors make decisions based on certain 
benchmarks.  
 
Sevin and Schroeder (2005), referring to the remarks made by Arthur Levitt, a former 
SEC chairman, on earnings management, explain that there are five major techniques that 
reduce the reliability of reported financial information. The first technique is known as 
“taking an earnings bath”, which means, overstating one-time restructuring expenses in 
the current period to reduce expenses to be reported in the future. The second technique 
is “creative acquisition accounting”, the practice of stating artificially large in-process 
research and development charges to avoid future expenses. According to Kokoszka 
(2003), these expenses occur during a merger, and merger accounting dictates the 
immediate write-off of these expenses by the acquiring firm. But, in order to misuse this 
accounting practice, the firm may overstate the expenses to reduce current period 
earnings. The third technique is commonly called creating “cookie jar” reserves, wherein 
a firm overstates sales returns or warranty costs in times of good financial performance 
and uses those overstatements in times of financial distress. Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(2003) attempt to find an association between earnings management and analyst 
recommendations and show that firms that receive a “buy” signal are more likely to 
engage in income-increasing earnings management in order to meet or slightly beat 
analysts’ forecasts, whereas firms with a “sell” signal are more likely to manage earnings 
downwards, indicating that these firms may have more incentives to take earnings baths 
or inflate accounting reserves. The fourth earnings management technique violates the 
materiality accounting concept by ignoring financial reporting errors and underestimating 
their significance. The fifth income-smoothing technique is the recognition and reporting 
of unearned revenue. A firm may be tempted to accelerate its growth and can potentially 
use this practice to report an artificially high income in a specific period.  
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One of the primary responsibilities of the board of directors is to ensure that managers act 
in the interest of the company’s shareholders. Healy and Palepu (2001) explain that 
corporate management has superior information about the firm’s prospects than do the 
outside shareholders, and this is commonly known as information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry exists in firms where there is a separation of ownership and 
control, i.e. when shareholders of a firm do not actively participate in management-related 
activities. This relationship between shareholders and managers is a typical agency 
relationship found in corporations, wherein the managers (agents) are given the 
responsibility to act on behalf of the stakeholders and maximize shareholders’ utility. The 
diversion of interests between the shareholders and the management is not an uncommon 
phenomenon, and it incurs agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that agency 
costs can be divided to three types: monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual costs. 
Board of directors’ fees and options-based management compensation are examples of 
monitoring costs, whereas the contractual obligation of a manager to stay with the 
company in case of an acquisition and lose the opportunity to obtain another potentially 
better employment is an example of bonding costs. Despite the measures taken to 
minimize agency problems, there are unexpected costs that arise due to information 
asymmetry, and these costs are known as residual costs. (Jensen and Meckling 1976.)  
 
Accrual accounting provides managers with accounting discretion that should be used 
effectively in order to provide a realistic view of a firm’s financial position and 
performance. However, in certain cases when managers have incentives to do so, it may 
also lead managers to misuse this discretion for private gains. For instance, managers may 
use accruals to reach a pre-determined earnings target and potentially influence the 
market value of the firm. Accounting accruals directly impact reported earnings without 
having any future consequences on the actual accounting cash flows, and when used 
unethically, are a potential sign of earnings management. This type of earnings 
management is referred to as accruals-based earnings management, and has been the 
focus of many studies related to earnings quality and earnings management. (Dechow & 
Skinner 2000; Hong & Anderson 2011.)  
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Discretionary Accruals and Modified Jones Model 
 
Accruals can be decomposed into two types- discretionary accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals. While non-discretionary accruals are a result of the firm’s business conditions, 
its operational model and the accounting policies, discretionary accruals arise from 
estimates that require managerial judgement. (Christensen, Frimor & Şabac 2013.) 
According to Mantone (2013), discretionary accruals are expenses that are not mandatory 
to be recorded, such as accrued management bonuses, bad debt and warranty allowances, 
inventory, etc. Managers may use discretionary accruals to maintain a low level of 
volatility in earnings from year to year or from quarter to quarter; this is also known as 
income smoothing, or, earnings management. Discretionary accruals can be estimated 
using various available methods; some of the most commonly used methods are the Jones 
Model and the Modified Jones Model. Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1995) explore the 
assumptions and efficiency of different models that are used to estimate discretionary 
accruals and detect earnings management. In their research, they conclude that the 
Modified Jones Model performs the best in estimating discretionary accruals to detect 
earnings management, although all the models performed sub-optimally in conditions of 
extreme financial performance.  
 
Modified Jones Model 
 
Discretionary accrual models before the Jones Model assumed that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant. However, Jones Model relaxed that assumption by stating that 
business and economic conditions impact a firm’s normal (or non-discretionary) accruals. 
Jones (1991), in her model, suggests that a firm’s revenues and its property, plant and 
equipment influence the amount of normal accruals during a period, but this is under the 
assumption that all revenues are non-discretionary. Dechow et al. (1995) propose a 
modification of the original Jones Model by claiming that not all revenues are non-
discretionary, and they further state that all changes in credit sales are due to managerial 
discretion with the motive of managing earnings.  
 
According to the Modified Jones Model, non-discretionary accruals can be calculated as:  
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(1) 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡  =  𝛼1(1/𝐴𝑡−1)  +  𝛼2(𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 – 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑡)  + 𝛼2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡) 
 
where 
NDAt = non-discretionary accruals in year t;  
At-1 = total assets in year t-1;  
REV = total tevenue in year t – total revenue in year t-1; 
RECt = net receivables in year t – net receivables in year t-1;  
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment in year t; and 
1, 2 and 3 = firm-specific parameters  
 
The estimates of the firm-specific parameters 1, 2 and 3 are obtained from the 
following regression:  
 
(2) 
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝑎1(
1
𝐴𝑡−1
+
𝑎2(∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡)
𝐴𝑡−1
+
𝑎3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 
TAt = total accruals in year t, and total accruals = net income – cash earnings; 
a1, a2 and a3 = OLS estimates of 1, 2 and 3; and  
t = error term  
 
 
2.3. Financial Risk and Derivatives 
 
Globalization has allowed corporations around the world to expand their business 
operations outside their own countries, but the high level of integration has also exposed 
these firms to various financial risks. Besides the pre-existing risk of unforeseeable 
changes in commodity prices (commodity price risk) and interest rates (interest rate risk), 
globalization introduced other types of risks that multinational firms need to manage. 
Further, globalization led to a higher degree of exposure to commodity price risk and 
interest rate risk due to inter-dependence among countries. Firms that acquire or sell raw 
materials, goods, or services in countries besides the one in which they are based, often 
22 
 
deal with transactions in multiple currencies. Therefore, any appreciation or depreciation 
in those currencies may lead to potential losses for the firms; this risk is known as 
transaction exchange risk and is a type of foreign exchange risk. (Bakaert, Hodrick & 
Zhang 2012.) 
 
Since the 1980s, the market for financial instruments that offer individuals and institutions 
the opportunity to hedge their exposure to financial risks has boomed; these financial 
instruments are known as financial derivatives. A financial derivative is an investment, 
whose price is based on the price of an underlying asset, such as equities and bonds, or 
interest rates, currency exchange rates, etc. These financial derivatives are traded on 
organized exchange platforms as well as over the counter. The most commonly used 
derivatives are forwards, futures, options, and swaps. (Bakaert et al. 2012.) A forward 
contract is an agreement that specifies the obligation of the holder (seller) to buy (sell) an 
asset at a particular price on a particular date in the future. Forward contracts can be 
bought or sold in the over-the-counter market. A futures contract is similar to a forward 
contract, but is only traded on an organized exchange. An option contract provides the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a specified price before or on a 
particular date in the future. Options are traded on over-the-counter markets as well as on 
exchanges. A swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange their future cash 
flows and is an over-the-counter investment. (Hull 2015.) Bartram, Brown & Fehle 
(2009), in a cross-section of over 7000 non-financial firms across the world in the year 
2000 or 2001, find that approximately 60% of the firms use at least one type of financial 
derivative. The most common derivative users were located in the United States, Japan, 
and United Kingdom and belonged to the utilities and chemical industry.  
 
2.3.1. Rationales for Hedging  
 
Brown (2001) states that traditional theories of risk management suggest the motivations 
for firms to engage in derivatives hedging are often to decrease the variance of operating 
cash flows in order to reduce financial distress costs. Purnanandam (2008) defines 
financial distress as the situation when a firm has low cash in-flows and incurs losses 
despite being solvent. Aretz, Bartram & Dufey (2007) explain that the existing financial 
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distress as well as the probability of a firm facing financial distress in the future incurs 
various direct and indirect costs for the firm. Direct costs, such as lawyer fees and 
administrative & accounting fees that are incurred during the bankruptcy usually account 
for only about 3% of the financial distress costs. Indirect costs, however, which relate to 
high employee turnover, increased recruiting and training costs, lack of power over 
suppliers and customers, constitute the major proportion of financial distress costs. When 
the inflow of cash is low, raising more debt causes more expenses; hence, using financial 
derivatives to smoothen future cash flows may add value to a firm.  
 
Another reason for firms to adopt risk management practices is to avoid underinvestment 
costs. According to Froot, Scharfstein & Stein (1993), when a firm incurs low cash flows 
and thus carries costly external debt, it responds by reducing investments and rejecting 
positive net-present-value projects, increasing underinvestment costs. This is due to the 
tradeoff between creating wealth for creditors or for shareholders, also known as agency 
conflict, which often arises from information asymmetry among stakeholders. By using 
financial derivatives as hedging instruments, a firm can thus increase its earnings and 
utilize investment opportunities in growth projects, maximizing value for shareholders as 
well as creditors (banks or bondholders). (Aretz et al. 2007; Gay & Nam 1998.) 
 
Apart from risk management theories related to firm-specific factors that influence the 
decision to hedge financial risks using derivative instruments, theories concerning 
management individual characteristics, CEO compensation structures, and managerial 
ownership also exist. Adkins, Carter and Simpson (2007), quoting previous studies, 
mention that equity ownership of high-level managers and directors may impact the 
decision to hedge positively due to the increased risk-aversion and incentives of a less 
volatile income. However, ownership of stock options by CEOs may influence the 
decision negatively, since the value of options increases with the increase in firm’s 
earnings’ volatility (and consequently stock price volatility).  The option-like convex 
compensation scheme increases the motivation for CEOs to undertake risky activities for 
personal gains, further strengthening agency conflicts.  
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Another important cluster of unrelated factors that influence the decision to use financial 
derivatives is the CEO’s (and other high-level management’s) personal risk appetite and 
the level of overconfidence, which have been shown to be highly influenced by individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender, education, working experience, and tenure. Adam, 
Fernando & Golubeva (2015), consistent with numerous previously conducted studies, 
find that managerial overconfidence significantly influences corporate risk management 
activities. Beber & Fabbri (2012) argue that while controlling for firm-specific and 
country-specific factors, the use of financial derivatives in non-financial firms may be 
partially explained by the informational advantage of CEOs who own MBA degrees or 
the overconfidence gained because of the high perceived value of the degree in the 
society. Gloede & Menkhoff (2014) find that among financial professionals, working 
experience in the field reduced the amount of overconfidence. According to Beber et al. 
(2015), managerial overconfidence is a reducing function of working experience and age, 
wherein inexperienced young managers overestimate their skills. Other studies have also 
provided evidence of gender’s impact on risk appetite of CEOs as well as retail investors.  
 
However, previous literature has shown that the corporate outcomes are influenced by 
corporate governance. Goel and Thakor (2008) show that although an overconfident 
manager is more likely to be appointed as the CEO, an overly overconfident CEO would 
be fired by the board of directors when the respective trait of the manager is discovered. 
Indeed, studies that aim to analyze the risk management policies of firms do not always 
control for management’s personal traits, but postulate that management’s income 
smoothing activities are a result of the firm’s quality of corporate governance quality. For 
instance, Huang, Zhang, Deis & Moffitt (2008), in their research paper on the contribution 
of artificial and real income smoothing to firm value, carry this assumption and find that 
firms with a higher proportion of independent board members and more financial 
sophisticated audit committee members engage more in real income smoothing and less 
in artificial income smoothing.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter deals with previous literature on the subject of derivatives hedging, earnings 
management, and the impact of these two income smoothing devices on firm 
performance. In the first section, the results reported by earlier studies on the factors 
determining the usage of financial derivatives in non-financial firms are discussed. This 
section is divided into three sub-sections specific to particular theories of hedging. The 
second section lays down the foundation for this study by discussing studies on the impact 
of artificial and real income smoothing on firm performance. In the last section of this 
chapter, the research motivation and objectives are outlined and hypotheses are formed 
based on the theoretical background and previous empirical literature.  
 
 
3.1. Firms and Hedging with Derivatives 
 
The traditional theories of risk management imply that the use of financial derivatives is 
entirely dependent on the characteristics of the firm and the business environment it 
operates in. The most famous theories of financial distress, underinvestment costs and tax 
incentives, are based on characteristics such as firm size, leverage, liquidity, growth 
opportunities, dividend policy, tax convexity, etc. Bartram, Brown & Fehle (2009) clearly 
specify the theoretical relationships between these variables and the likely use of 
derivatives by non-financial firms. Based on the theory of financial distress, smaller firms, 
firms with lower liquidity, with a low dividend payout, and higher leverage, are more 
likely to use derivatives to hedge financial risk. The underinvestment theory states that 
firms with more research and development expenditures and a higher market-to-book 
ratio are more probable to use derivatives. In this chapter, the findings of various studies 
on the relationship between firm-specific factors and the use of financial derivatives are 
discussed. 
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3.1.1. Financial Distress Costs 
 
In one of the earliest studies in the field done by Nance, Smith & Smithson (1993), they 
hypothesize the relationships between firm size, profitability, and liquidity, and a firm’s 
decision to use financial derivatives based on the theories stated above. Using a logit 
regression, they find that firm size is positively related to the decision to use derivatives, 
which is contradictory to their prediction and the theory of financial distress. They 
conclude that this might be due to the informational advantage of larger firms. It is 
important to note that this result is commonly found in most studies related to the 
corporate use of derivatives (Bodnar, Consolandi, Gabbi & Jaiswal-Dale 2013). Indeed, 
a meta-analysis by Arnold, Rathgeber & Stöckl (2014), that used results from 37 previous 
studies, provided evidence of this common finding. The positive relationship between 
firm size and the likelihood of derivatives usage has been explained by various theories, 
one of them being the economies of scale and fixed costs theory. Lievenbrück & Schmid 
(2014) and Allayannis & Ofek (2001), finding similar results, state that larger firms with 
established risk management systems incur less start-up costs associated with adopting 
the use of derivatives. Entrop & Merkel (2017) explain the similar finding with the 
possible higher exposure of larger firms to foreign exchange rate risk and interest rate 
risk.  In contrast, Croci, Giudice & Jankensgård (2017) find a negative relationship 
between firm size and the decision to use derivatives. However, this is most likely due to 
the restricted sample of oil and gas firms in Italy, which are mainly large in size and hence 
lead to a biased result.  
 
While the relationship between profitability and hedging with derivatives has not been 
evident, the results for the impact of liquidity on the same have been significantly 
uniform. Arnold, Rathgeber & Stöckl (2014), in their meta-analysis of 37 prior studies, 
conclude that the summary effect of liquidity on the use of derivatives is significant and 
negative. This is in line with the financial distress hypothesis, that firms with less cash 
flow are financially restricted to engage in hedging. This is especially true for smaller 
firms (Bartram et al. 2009). Geczy, Minton & Schrand (1997), in their influential study 
of the determinants of derivatives usage in the United States, also find that a higher 
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liquidity ratio is negatively related to the use of derivatives. They elaborate and mention 
that lower availability of internal funds increases the incentives for firms to hedge.  
The significance of dividend policy is related to the profitability of the firm, assuming 
that a publicly listed firm only pays out dividends to its shareholders in a profitable 
scenario. However, it can be argued that firms have the option to raise more debt in order 
to pay out dividends to its shareholders, which is an inefficient way to provide value, 
albeit a possible case. Also, a firm’s decision to pay out dividends may also be 
discretionary, and may subsequently lead to less use of financial derivatives due to less 
free funds available. (Arnold et al. 2014; Barton 2001.)  Graham & Rogers (2002) propose 
that dividend payout and hedging with derivatives may be substitutes. Hence, the results 
related to the effect of dividend payout on hedging decision may not be reliable. 
Nevertheless, Nance et al. (1993) find a positive association between dividend payout 
decision and the decision to use derivatives. Bodnar, Giambona, Graham & Harvey 
(2016), using a sample of non-financial firms from across the world, also find a positive 
relationship between the two. It is noteworthy that both these studies gathered data using 
surveys, which may have affected the validity of the findings.  
 
3.1.2. Underinvestment Costs   
 
Analyzing previous studies, the relationship between underinvestment costs, as proxied 
by firm leverage, market-to-book ratio & research and development expenditure, and the 
use of financial derivatives cannot be predicted with confidence. While some studies find 
a significant impact of underinvestment costs on the decision to use derivatives, other 
studies find no significant impact. Interestingly, new variables - the interaction of 
leverage and market-to-book ratio and the interaction of leverage and R&D costs and 
leverage, are found to be more important with the rationale that they proxy for growth 
firms with high amounts of debt and thus higher underinvestment costs. Bartram et al. 
(2009), who studied the determinants of the use of financial derivatives in firms across 
all industries in 50 countries, find that leverage, as well as the interaction between 
leverage and market-to-book ratio, positively influence the decision to use derivatives. In 
contrast, Allayannis & Ofek (2001) find a negative impact of leverage and a positive 
impact of R&D costs on derivatives hedging in a sample of S&P 500 firms in 1993. Croci, 
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Giudice & Jankensgård (2017) also find a positive relationship between leverage and the 
likely use of derivatives in a sample of Italian oil and gas firms between 2000 and 2013. 
Graham & Rogers (2002), in an effort to find the tax incentives of non-financial U.S. 
firms to hedge using derivatives, show a negative impact of R&D costs and a higher 
market-to-book ratio on the magnitude of derivatives used, but a positive impact of the 
interaction between debt ratio and R&D costs and the extent of hedging with derivatives. 
A similar result was published by Barton (2001) in a sample of non-financial Fortune 500 
companies between 1994 and 1996, who find that firms with high underinvestment costs 
are more likely to use derivatives and more to use them more. Geczy et al. (1997), using 
a similar sample as Barton (2001) in 1990, also find similar results. Using survey data 
and a logistic regression model, Nance et al. (1993) also found no impact of leverage on 
the decision to hedge with derivatives. According to them, the reason is that other 
variables that proxy for investment opportunity set (R&D costs, market-to-book ratio) 
were used. Also, since leverage is a factor that is used to test the financial distress 
hypothesis (that predicts a positive influence on derivatives use) as well as the 
underinvestment hypothesis (growth firms usually have lower debt ratio), the effect of 
leverage on the decision to use derivatives is minimized due to other substitute variables 
(Graham et al. 2002).  
 
Considering the controversial results obtained by previous studies on the proxies for 
underinvestment costs, it is evident that the underinvestment hypothesis has not proven 
to be very successful in explaining the usage of financial derivatives by corporates in 
order to manage risk. The meta-analysis by Arnold et al. (2014) also provided consistent 
results, stating that the evidence for underinvestment hypothesis is limited.  
 
3.1.3. Risk Exposure  
 
Graham and Rogers (2002) state that in imperfect market conditions, hedging can provide 
value to firms that hedge financial risks using derivatives by reducing costs related to 
undesirable price movements in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices, 
etc. In their restricted sample of 469 non-financial firms from the U.S. in 1995, they 
observe that 442 of the firms are exposed to either currency risk or interest rate risk, or 
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both. Similar to most studies, they proxy currency risk by foreign sales, and interest rate 
risk by the ratio of floating debt to total assets and by the sensitivity of a firm’s operating 
income to the LIBOR rate. Using OLS regression, they find that exposure to currency risk 
positively impacts the magnitude of derivatives usage. They do not find any significant 
effect of interest rate risk. Bartram et al. (2014) find a significant positive relationship 
between FX exposure and the decision to use derivatives for hedging purposes. 
Lievenbrück & Schmid (2014), using a sample of energy utility companies from across 
the world from 2000 to 2009, find that risk exposures have a positive impact on the 
decision to use the specific types of derivative. Specifically, they find that FX exposure 
positively impacts the decision to use currency derivatives, commodity price risk 
positively affects the decision to use commodity derivatives, and interest rate risk 
positively affects the decision to use interest rate derivatives as well as commodity 
derivatives. Allayannis et al. (2001) also find a positive relationship between FX exposure 
and the use of derivatives in a sample of S&P 500 non-financial firms from 1993. In their 
research, while other firm-specific factors also showed a significant impact on the 
decision to use derivatives, only exposure proxies displayed a significant and positive 
impact on the extent of derivatives usage. Graham et al. (2002) and Geczy et al. (1997), 
who also used a sample of non-financial firms from the U.S., find a similar result 
concerning the impact of FX exposure on the magnitude of the derivatives use.  Similarly, 
Klimczak (2008) also a found the similar relationship using a sample of non-financial 
listed companies from Poland between 2001 and 2005. Considering the uniformity of the 
relationship between risk exposure and the use of derivatives, it is evident that despite the 
intermediate effect of firm-specific characteristics, exposure to a specific type of risk 
induces a firm’s decision to hedge using financial derivatives at least to some extent. 
 
 
3.2. Previous Studies on the Impact of Earnings Management and Hedging with 
Derivatives on Firm Performance 
 
Tang & Chang (2015) investigate the intermediary effect of corporate governance on the 
value relevance of earnings management using a sample of listed Taiwanese firms during 
1996 - 2008. They first run separate OLS regressions on firm value estimated by Tobin’s 
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Q and Return on Assets as dependent variables, and discretionary accruals and current 
discretionary accruals as independent variables. They find that the two earnings quality 
measures have a statistically significant negative relationship with the value indicators, 
meaning that higher values for discretionary accruals and current discretionary accruals 
result in lower firm value. The authors then include corporate governance measures into 
the equations and find that the relationship between earnings quality and firm value is 
influenced by corporate governance factors. The results of the study indicate that higher 
discretionary accruals and current discretionary accruals lead to higher firm value in firms 
with effective corporate governance, but lead to lower firm value in firms with poor 
corporate governance. This finding is consistent with the theory that opportunistic 
managers use accounting discretion for private gains, whereas value-adding managers use 
accounting discretion to communicate useful information on the firm’s future prospects 
to shareholders. (Tang & Chang 2015.) 
 
Chen, Kim & Yao (2017), in a recent study, attempt to find out whether earnings 
smoothing increases or decreases stock price crash risk after an earnings announcement. 
They use a sample of 6627 non-financial, non-utility firms listed in the United States 
during 1993 - 2011, a 19-year period, with a total of 157,722 firm-year observations. 
Their research uses the distribution of daily stock returns on the sample firms as a measure 
of stock price crash risk and the correlation between the change in discretionary accruals 
and the change in pre-managed earnings as the indicator of earnings management. The 
authors also use various control variables, including a measure of smoothing 
aggressiveness - the absolute value of discretionary accruals. They report a significant 
and negative correlation between earnings smoothing and crash risk. Next, they perform 
a regression analysis and find that higher earnings smoothing in the current period 
(quarter) leads to a higher realized crash risk in the subsequent period, and this finding is 
reported to be statistically significant at the 1 % significance level. Further, they observe 
a significant and positive coefficient on their smoothing aggressiveness measure, 
implying that higher level of absolute discretionary accruals is related to a higher stock 
price crash risk. The authors also perform a regression using stock return measures as 
dependent variables, and find with statistically significant coefficients that earnings 
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smoothing and aggressiveness thereof is negatively related to market return, depicting the 
value-destroying effect of earnings management. (Chen, Kim and Yao 2017.) 
 
The study by Lin, Jiang, Tang and He (2014) takes a different approach to identifying the 
effect of financial reporting quality on firm’s market performance. The authors use a 
diversified sample of firms from the United Kingdom during 2005 and 2009 with a total 
of 4251 firm-year observations and determine the impact of earnings quality on the stock 
market liquidity as measured by firm-specific bid-ask spread, which has shown to be 
positively related to market value. They argue that good quality financial reporting 
reduces information asymmetry in the market during crisis period and increases investor 
confidence in the firms. By proxying for earnings quality with the absolute amount of 
discretionary accruals calculated using performance-matched Jones model, and 
employing OLS regression methodology, the authors report a negative and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term of discretionary accruals and crisis dummy variable on 
the bid-ask spread, signifying that higher financial reporting quality impacts liquidity 
positively during crisis period. Interestingly, the authors report that financial reporting 
quality does not affect liquidity under ordinary economic conditions. Further, when 
discretionary accruals are calculated using other models, such as Jones model, Modified 
Jones model, etc., the results remain the same. The authors also test this finding 
exclusively for financial firms and non-financial firms and report that both groups of firms 
exhibited similar liquidity behavior towards financial reporting quality during the global 
financial crisis. (Lin, Jiang, Tang and He 2014.) 
 
Huang, Zhang, Deis & Moffitt (2009), in their paper, try to identify the impact of artificial 
income smoothing and real income smoothing by using discretionary accruals and 
notional amount of outstanding derivatives as proxies for artificial and real income 
smoothing, respectively. Their sample includes 477 non-financial firms from the United 
States during the period 1994 - 1996. The derivatives-related data was obtained from the 
1997 Interest Rate and Currency Derivatives Edition of “Database of Users of 
Derivatives”, published by Swaps Monitor Publications, Inc. In order to control for 
endogeneity, the authors employ a two-stage least squares regression and find that the 
level of artificial smoothing i.e. the absolute value of discretionary variables lagged by 
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total assets, is inversely proportional to firm value estimated using industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q. They also find that the extent of derivatives usage is directly proportional to 
firm value. These results are statistically significant and in line with their alternative 
hypothesis. Consistent with various other studies on the relationship between artificial 
and real income smoothing, Huang et al. (2009) observe a negative significant 
relationship between the two techniques. Another important finding of the paper is the 
intermediary effect of corporate governance on the relationship between smoothing 
devices and firm value. Huang et al. (2009) report that the value-increasing effect of 
derivative usage is lower in well-governed firms and the value-decreasing effect of 
artificial income smoothing is higher in poorly governed firms. They use various 
indicators of corporate governance quality, such as the percentage of outsiders on the 
board of directors and the audit committee, and the financial expertise and meeting 
frequency of the audit committee, among other variables. (Huang, Zhang, Deis & Moffitt 
2009.) 
 
Bao and Bao (2004), similar to Huang et al. (2009), argue that income smoothing can be 
done artificially or through real economic changes in the cash flows. They use a sample 
of non-financial firms between 1988 and 2000, with a total of 12,651 firm-year 
observations and divide them between smoothers and non-smoothers to determine the 
impact of smoothing activities on firm value proxied by Price-to-Earnings multiple. 
Notably, the authors distinguish between smoothers and non-smoothers by using 
variation in earnings from one period to another, instead of using derivatives-based 
hedging as a proxy for income smoothers. They further divide their sample between 
smoothers with high quality earnings, smoothers with low quality earnings, non-
smoothers with high quality earnings and non-smoothers with low quality earnings. The 
regression results show that income smoothing does not result in higher firm value 
without taking into consideration the impact of earnings quality. On the other hand, firms 
with higher quality earnings hold higher P/E multiples even when smoothing activities 
are not accounted for. However, smoothing firms with high quality earnings are reported 
to have higher P/E multiples than non-smoothing firms with low quality earnings. (Bao 
& Bao 2004.) 
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Allayannis and Weston (2001), in one of the earliest studies aiming to determine the 
potential impact of using currency derivatives on firm value, find positive significant 
results supporting their hypothesis. They use sample of 720 large non-financial firms 
(excluding public utilities) from the United States between 1990 and 1995, a period when 
reporting the gross notional amount of derivatives was required of publicly listed firms in 
the country. In their univariate analyses, the authors divide their sample into firms with 
foreign sales operations and firms without it, and compare the mean Tobin Q value (proxy 
for firm value) between hedgers and non-hedgers. The results for both sub-samples 
indicate that hedgers of foreign currency risk have a higher mean and median Tobin Q 
value than non-hedgers. In order to control for the impact of other firm-specific 
characteristics, they perform multivariate analyses including control variables for size, 
profitability, leverage, investment opportunities, access to financial markets, credit 
quality, industry, etc. In the sub-sample of firms that have foreign operations, the 
regression analysis leads to a positive and significant coefficient on the hedging decision 
binary variable, suggesting that regardless of the impact of firm-specific factors on firm 
value, the decision to hedge foreign currency risk influences firm value positively. 
However, the sub-sample of firms with no foreign operations, a positive but statistically 
insignificant impact of hedging on firm value is observed. In order to test for reverse 
causality, the authors perform a time series analysis as well as an event study on the 
sample of firms, determining whether the decision to hedge in a specific period or the 
change in hedging policy lead to positive change in firm value. Consistent with their panel 
regression results, they find consistent evidence of the positive and statistically significant 
effect of currency hedging using derivatives on the market value of firm in these 
robustness tests. (Allayannis & Weston 2001.) 
 
Following a similar approach as Allayannis and Weston (2001), Clark and Mefteh (2010) 
attempt to determine the impact of using foreign currency derivatives to hedge exposure 
risk to Euro for the largest publicly listed French firms in the year 2004 on their market 
value. Their final sample includes 176 non-financial listed firms. Of the 176 firms, 58.52 
% of the firms are reported to have used currency derivatives in 2004, which is higher 
than the 37 % usage reported by Allayannis et al. (2001). Clark and Mefteh (2010) use 
the notional amount of currency derivatives scaled by total assets as the primary 
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independent variable in their regression analyses and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. 
Their results indicate that the extent of hedging is positively and significantly related to 
firm value for firms with higher than median size of total assets. Further, the authors focus 
on the intermediary value creating effect of the amount currency exposure as well as the 
exposure direction (appreciation or depreciation). They find that this positive effect of 
currency derivatives usage is stronger for firms that are relatively more exposed to 
fluctuations in Euro and weaker for firms with lower exposure. In addition, the effect is 
approximately six times higher for firms that are vulnerable to depreciation in Euro than 
for firms that are exposed to appreciation in the currency. (Clark & Mefteh 2010.) 
 
In a more recent publication, Panaretou (2014) report similar results as Huang et al. 
(2009) using a sample of large non-financial firms belonging to FTSE 350 from the 
United Kingdom during the period 2003 - 2010; the sample used in the study covers 1372 
firm-year observations. According to the descriptive statistics presented in the paper, 
86.88 % of the firms use derivatives to hedge at least one type of risk during the sample 
period. For the multiple regression analysis, the author employs various models in the 
regression analysis, all using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, but different hedging-
related variables. The two main groups of regression models separate the impact of the 
decision to use derivatives from the impact of the extent of derivatives usage (measured 
by the ratio of notional-value of derivatives to total assets) on firm value. The study also 
includes regressions that isolate the type of risk hedged using derivatives i.e. currency 
derivative, interest derivatives and commodity derivatives. Results of the regression 
comprising all types of hedging instruments indicate no significant impact of the decision 
to hedge on the firm value, but a positive impact of the extent of hedging. However, the 
regression using only currency risk hedgers shows a positive and significant impact of 
the decision to hedge as well as the extent thereof on firm value, whereas no statistically 
significant impact of commodity risk hedging is observed in the respective regression. 
The model including interest rate hedgers indicates an insignificant impact of the decision 
to hedge, but a positive and significant impact of the extent of hedging.  
Panaretou (2014) also tests for the impact of the financial crisis on firm value as well as 
on the hedging premium during the crisis period. The results of the analysis covering the 
whole sample period (2003 - 2010), but using binary variables concerning crisis period 
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and the interaction of the same with extent of hedging variable, indicate no statistically 
significant impact of currency and interest rate hedging on firm value, but a negative and 
significant impact of the financial crisis on firm value. However, when the regressions 
are done only using the sub-samples during the financial crisis period, a positive but lower 
hedging premium is observed for currency hedgers between 2007 and 2008, but a 
negative hedging premium is observed for interest rate hedgers. Further, in an attempt to 
identify the impact of operational risk management on firm value, the author reports 
statistically insignificant impact of corporate operational risk management activities on 
Tobin’s Q during the sample period 2003 - 2010. (Panaretou 2014.) 
 
Contrary to studies on the value-creating characteristic of derivatives usage in firms 
belonging to one specific country, Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) use a large sample 
of 6,888 non-financial firms from 47 countries in their extensive study on the subject. 
Their sample represents 76.8 % of the global market capitalization of non-financial firms 
in the year 2001. 60.5 % of the firms in the sample use at least one type of derivatives, 
with FX derivatives being most commonly used (45.5 %). The authors use propensity 
matching technique to control for endogeneity and employ time-series analysis to identify 
the impact of using derivatives on abnormal stock return as well as firm value measured 
by Tobin’s Q. During the study’s sample period of 1998 - 2003, the positive impact of 
hedging is only statistically significant in the year 2001, which is associated with a major 
global economic slowdown. On the other hand, derivative users exhibit higher alphas in 
each annual period except 1998, with the highest difference being observed in the year 
2000. This result implies that firms are hedging downside risk by using financial 
derivatives. (Bartram, Brown and Conrad 2011.) 
Jin and Jorion (2006) explore the relationship between hedging with derivatives and firm 
value using a sample of oil and gas firms from the United States during the years 1998 
and 2001. They state that an investor in an oil and gas firm is able to identify the price 
risk associated with it and hedge it themselves, making this market condition closer to 
that hypothesized by Modigliani and Miller capital market theory. However, they still 
observe significant variation in the extent of hedging undertaken by the 119 firms 
included in the sample. The authors mention that given the relatively small size of the 
sample firms, the impact of derivatives-based hedging is unclear due to the fixed costs 
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associated with establishing the corporate risk management programme, justifying the 
importance of their sample selection decision. The descriptive statistics in the paper report 
that 92 of the 119 firms use derivatives for hedging at least once during the 3-year sample 
period. Univariate analysis of the research suggests no statistically significant differences 
in firm values between hedgers and non-hedgers. Using various calculations of Tobin’s 
Q and a binary hedging variable indicating usage vs. non-usage of derivatives in their 
regressions, the authors report a generally statistically insignificant impact of hedging on 
firm value, with one regression model resulting in a negative and statistically significant 
effect of hedging on firm value. Jin and Jorion (2006) conclude that the hedging premium 
related to derivatives usage is unclear, but it may depend on the risk a firm is exposed to. 
(Jin & Jorion 2006.) 
 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006), similar to Jin and Jorion (2006), use a sample of firms 
belonging to a specific sector in order to identify whether hedging fuel price risk leads to 
market value creation. Using a sample of 28 listed passenger airline firms from the United 
States during 1992 - 2003 with 251 firm-value observations, the authors perform OLS 
regressions with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and a binary hedging variable as 
well as a continuous hedging variable, separately. The results of their pooled-OLS 
regression indicate that for the firms in the sample, the decision to hedge does not lead to 
a higher firm value, but a higher extent of hedging does. They report a hedging premium 
of approx. 10.2 % for a firm that hedges the sample average of 29.4 % of the upcoming 
year’s fuel requirements. This additional market value derived from hedging is greater 
than the one observed by Allayannis and Weston (2001), which was approx. 5 %. Carter 
et al. (2006) also perform robustness tests by using random effects, fixed effects, and 
time-series feasible generalized least squares models, all of which lead to positive and 
significant results for their hypothesis that hedging fuel price risk creates value for airline 
companies. Further, the authors test whether their results are driven by reverse causality, 
by analyzing whether changes in hedging policy (binary variable movement from 0 to 1 
and vice versa as well as a change in the continuous variable) lead to a change in firm 
value. The results of this regression lead to results rejecting the reverse causality 
hypothesis, and confirm the observation of hedging premium in the airline companies 
included in the sample. (Carter, Rogers and Simkins 2006.) 
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Nelson, Moffitt and Affleck-Graves (2005) use a relatively large sample of 5770 non-
financial publicly listed US firms to evaluate the impact of hedging on the stock returns 
of firms during the years 1995 - 2000. Their sample included firms from all sectors except 
financial and utilities, and comprised of 1308 firms that hedged using at least one type of 
derivative during the sample period. This hedger-to-non-hedger proportion of 21.6 % is 
significantly lower than the one observed in most research papers on the subject. A major 
portion of these hedgers is observed to be large firms. The authors use abnormal stock 
returns as the primary variable to identify the differences in the market value of equity 
between hedgers and non-hedgers and calculate it by using the Fama and French four-
factor method. The study reports that hedgers outperformed non-hedgers by 4.3 % 
annually during the sample period, but this result is driven exclusively by large firms that 
hedged currency risk. When the authors use sub-samples of firms that either use currency 
derivatives, interest rate derivatives or commodity derivatives exclusively, they find that 
that the currency hedgers experienced abnormal returns equal to 11.22 % annually, the 
result being statistically significant. However, the results for the other two sub-samples 
are statistically insignificant, with the exclusive commodity risk hedgers experiencing 
negative abnormal returns. The authors also performed robustness tests by comparing 
mean Tobin Q values for hedgers of different types of risks and non-hedgers, and affirm 
that large currency hedgers had higher firm value relative to non-hedgers, but find 
significant lower values of Tobin Q for smaller firms that hedged currency risk as well as 
firms that hedged interest rate or commodity risk. (Nelson, Moffitt and Affleck-Graves 
2005.) 
 
Toerien & Lambrechts (2016), using a sample of the 40 largest non-financial firms listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, attempt to find the importance of firm value in in 
corporate derivative-hedging activities. The authors choose to analyze the impact of 
hedging on the firms’ Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets, Stock price, among other indicators 
of firm value, during the period 2008 - 2012, which included the years when the effect of 
the global financial crisis was the largest. The results of the univariate analysis on 203 
firm-year observations indicated a statistically significant positive relationship between 
the magnitude of the net derivative position and the firm value variable. However, when 
the authors perform a maximum likelihood estimate auto-regressive analysis, the results 
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are different - no statistically significant relationship is identified between the hedging 
variable and the firm value variables, except for the dependent variable that calculated 
the difference between the market value of equity and the capital contributed by the 
shareholders. However, the authors find no conclusive evidence that hedging with 
derivatives adds value to the sample firms. They state that the results may be different 
from those achieved by other studies on the subject that used a sample of firms from 
developed nations due to structural differences in the economies, differences in market 
information asymmetry and in investor attitudes. (Toerien & Lambrechts 2016.) Table 1 
provides a summary of discussed literature on the relationship between hedging and firm 
value. 
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Table 1. Summary of Literature on Hedging and Firm Performance 
 
 
 
 
Paper Period Hedging variable type Firm performance measure Result 
Huang, Zhang, Deis & Moffitt (2009) 1994-1996 Continuous variable Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q  Hedging is directly proportional to Tobin’s Q 
 Value-relevance of hedging is decreases with corporate governance 
quality 
     
Allayannis & Weston (2001) 1990-1995 Binary variable Tobin’s Q  Foreign currency risk hedging increases Tobin’s Q 
     
Clark & Mefteh (2010) 2004 Continuous variable Tobin’s Q  Hedging increases Tobin’s Q for firms with higher than median total 
assets 
     
Panaretou (2014) 2003-2010 Binary variable & 
Continuous variable 
Tobin’s Q  Decision to hedge does not increase Tobin’s Q 
 Extent of hedging increases Tobin’s Q 
 Decision to hedge foreign currency risk increases Tobin’s Q 
     
Bartram, Brown & Conrad (2011) 1998-2003 Binary variable Tobin’s Q & Abnormal Stock 
Return 
 Hedgers have higher Tobin’s Q during the year representing the crisis 
 Hedgers have higher alphas in all years except 1998 
 Firms hedge downside risk by using financial derivatives 
     
Jin & Jorion (2006) 1998-2001 Binary variable Tobin’s Q  Hedging does not impact Tobin’s Q for oil and gas firms 
     
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) 1992-2003 Binary variable & 
Continuous variable 
Tobin’s Q  The decision to hedge fuel price risk does not increase Tobin’s Q for 
airlines 
 Extent of fuel price hedging increases Tobin’s Q for airlines 
     
Nelson, Moffitt and Affleck-Graves 
(2005) 
1995-2000 Binary variable Abnormal Stock Return  Hedgers have higher abnormal stock returns 
     
Toerien & Lambrechts (2016) 2008-2012 Continuous variable Tobin’s Q, Stock Return, 
Return on Assets 
 Hedging has no impact on firm value and performance on firms listed on 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
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Artificial Income Smoothing, Hedging, and Corporate Governance 
 
Various research papers have been dedicated to finding the relationship between artificial 
and real income smoothing, but have led to mixed results. Attia (2012) uses a sample of 
504 non-financial US firms between 1993 and 2004 to investigate the relationship. As a 
measure of artificial income smoothing, the ratio of the standard deviation of net income 
before abnormal accruals and extraordinary items to the standard deviation of abnormal 
accruals. Real income smoothing is measured by the ratio of notional amount of 
derivatives outstanding to total assets. The author hypothesizes that the two smoothing 
devices have a substitutional relationship and that corporate governance quality affects 
artificial smoothing negatively, but impacts real income smoothing positively. By 
employing a simultaneous equations regression model, the author finds contrary to the 
hypothesis that the two smoothing devices have a complimentary relationship, providing 
several explanations for the result. First, the paper suggests that the two techniques fill in 
the gaps to reach an efficient risk management strategy. Second, it is suggested that 
hedging with derivatives may be used to compensate for opportunistic earnings 
management. Third, the author states that the result may be due to the discretionary 
accruals calculation bias - the differing impacts of long vs. short-term discretionary 
accruals. The study further finds that the level of derivatives usage increases in firms with 
a high quality of corporate governance practices, whereas the level of artificial income 
smoothing decreases in these firms. (Attia 2012.) 
 
Barton (2001), in an influential study on the relationship between earnings management 
and derivatives usage, finds different results from Attia (2012). The author uses a sample 
of 304 non-financial unregulated Fortune 500 firms during 1994 - 1996 in the analysis 
and finds that 218 firms out of the sample used derivatives for hedging purposes, and 86 
firms were non-hedgers. As a proxy for earnings management, the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals measured by Jones model is used, while the ratio of notional 
outstanding currency and interest-rate derivatives to lagged total assets is used to measure 
derivatives hedging. Although the author reports a positive correlation between the two 
smoothing devices, the simultaneous equations regression results in a negative and 
statistically significant relationship, albeit at a margin. The regression also includes 
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control variables for underinvestment costs, debt financing costs, tax convexity, and 
management compensation structure. Barton (2001) concludes that discretionary accruals 
and derivatives are used as partial substitutes to achieve a desirable volatility in the firm 
earnings, which helps managers gain value for private gains while also avoiding 
additional interest and tax related costs. (Barton 1991.) 
 
Choi, Mao & Upadhyay (2015), following Barton (1991), perform a similar study on the 
subject using a sample of 404 S&P 500 non-financial firms during 1996 - 2006. They 
hypothesize that due to the introduction of FAS 133 accounting standard in 1998, the 
relationship between the use of discretionary accruals and derivatives may have changed. 
According to them, the new accounting standard made it obligatory for firms to report the 
fair market value of their outstanding derivatives and also to recognize the ineffective part 
of cash flow hedges immediately. This effect, in turn, may have led to management belief 
that derivatives-based hedging had become inefficient. To validate their theory, the 
authors use a simultaneous equations regression model similar to that used by Barton 
(1991), and find consistent with their hypothesis a complementary relationship between 
artificial income smoothing and derivatives-based income smoothing. They further 
perform robustness tests on their results by using a binary variable to indicate derivatives 
usage in their simultaneous equations model. The reasoning behind this arises from the 
fact that after the introduction of FAS 133, some firms reported notional values of 
outstanding derivatives while most firms reported their fair values. To overcome this 
inconsistency, the binary variable was used to indicate derivatives usage. This robustness 
test led to similar results in line with the authors’ hypothesis that the two income 
smoothing techniques became complementary in nature after the introduction of FAS 
133. (Choi, Mao & Upadhyay 2015.) 
 
Pincus & Rajgopal (2002), using a narrowed down sample of approx. 140 oil and gas 
firms from the United States during 1993 - 1996, propose that these can hedge the risk of 
movements in oil prices, but cannot hedge the risk inherent in drilling operations. They 
hypothesize that, after managers of oil and gas firms have hedged the financial risk due 
to unfavorable movements in oil prices, they trade-off the operational risk by using 
discretionary accruals management. The results of their analysis indicate that this is 
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indeed the case, i.e., they report a sequential decision making process of managers 
whereby the extent of accruals management is dependent on the level of derivatives 
usage. This result differs from that of Barton (1991) in that Barton (1991) finds a two-
way substitutional relationship between the two smoothing devices, but Pincus et al. 
(2002) only find a one-way marginally substitutional relationship between hedging using 
derivatives and managing discretionary accruals. (Pincus & Rajgopal 2002.) 
 
 
3.3. Research Objectives and Hypotheses formation 
 
As can be concluded from the previous literature discussed above, mixed results have 
been reported on the relationship between derivatives hedging and firm performance, 
whereas the relationship between earnings management and firm performance has been 
widely reported to be negative. This study extends this literature by analyzing the impact 
of using derivatives to hedge financial risk (real income smoothing) and discretionary 
accruals (earnings management) simultaneously on the compounded monthly stock 
returns of a sample of non-financial firms.  
 
There are several ways in which this study is unique, the first being the use of stock 
returns as a measure of firm performance. Previous research on the impact of artificial 
and real income smoothing on firm performance has mostly employed Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of market performance. However, Bartlett & Partnoy (2018) state that simple 
Tobin’s q poses measurement errors due to substitution of market value of debt with book 
value of debt and an inaccurate proxy for replacement value of assets (book value of 
assets). Further, Tobin Q’s original version as well carries the unanswered question of 
why the market value of a firm should be scaled by the replacement cost thereof. In 
addition, the relationship between Tobin’s Q measures and the respective firms’ stock 
returns has been reported as inverse, implying a difference between firm’s estimated 
market value and the firm’s performance in the stock market. Thus, stock returns are a 
better alternate to Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance as they are a direct measure 
of a firm’s relative position in the market. (Bartlett & Partnoy 2018.) This study uses 
compounded monthly stock returns as a measure of firm performance in the market. This 
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measure provides a more accurate representation of a firm’s stock market performance 
because it takes into account the volatility of stock prices throughout the year, unlike 
holding period return. Further, this measure is based on geometric mean, which also takes 
into consideration the compounding from one period to the next.  
 
Secondly, this study evaluates the impact of derivatives use on stock returns while 
accounting for the effect of artificial income smoothing - an intermediated relationship 
that has not been researched extensively, although the negative impact of earnings 
management has been widely reported by many previous papers, some of which have 
been discussed earlier in this main chapter. Further, literature has shown mixed results on 
the direction of relationship between discretionary accruals and the extent of derivatives 
usage, which increases the importance of including both measures when analyzing the 
impact of income smoothing on firm performance in order to avoid omitted variable bias 
and potential endogeneity.  
 
Thirdly, an important contribution of this study is the investigation of the impact of 
hedging and earnings management during a period that includes the years 2008 - 2009, 
the period representing the global financial crisis. Although the financial sector was most 
affected by the crisis, non-financial sectors around the world also experienced the impacts 
up to a great extent. (Clarke 2010; Kirkpatrick 2009.) During the crisis, uncertainty and 
risk related to the reliability of public corporate information, were higher than before (Lin, 
Jiang, Tang & He 2014). Kirkpatrick (2009), in an article discussing the relevance of 
corporate governance during the financial crisis, concluded that the quality of corporate 
governance and risk management in a non-financial firm is a significant determinant of 
firm performance in chaotic times. Several other papers have studied the impact of 
corporate governance quality on firm performance during the financial crisis of the late 
2000s, but only a few have focused directly on the issues of earnings management and 
hedging while taking into consideration the intermediary impact of corporate governance. 
This study uses the proportion of strictly independent board members on the sample 
firms’ boards as a measure of corporate governance quality and tests the intermediary 
effect on the impact of artificial and real income smoothing on firm performance. 
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Based on the study objectives stated above and the previous literature discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter, the null research hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H0a: Real income smoothing, as proxied by the decision to use financial derivatives for 
hedging, does not have an impact firm performance, as measured by compounded 
monthly stock return. 
 
H0b: The magnitude of artificial income smoothing, as proxied by the absolute amount 
of discretionary accruals, does not have an impact firm performance, as measured by 
compounded monthly stock return. 
 
In contradiction to the above stated null hypothesis, various alternative hypotheses can be 
formed on the basis of studies that report a statistically significant impact of hedging and 
earnings management on firm performance. Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Panaretou 
(2014) report a positive impact of the decision to use foreign currency derivatives on firm 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, and Tang and Chang (2015) observe a negative 
impact of discretionary accruals on Tobin’s Q. In support of these results, alternative 
hypotheses could be stated as below. 
 
H1a: The decision to use financial derivatives for hedging has a positive impact on firm 
performance. 
 
H1b: The magnitude of discretionary accruals has a negative impact on firm 
performance. 
 
However, in line with Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011), who report a positive 
relationship between hedging using derivatives and firm performance during the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s crisis period in the United States, it is expected that the decision 
to use financial derivatives for hedging has no impact on firm performance in the pre-
crisis period (2005 - 2007), but a positive impact during the crisis period (2008 - 2009).  
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H2: Hedging using financial derivatives is more valuable during crisis period than in the 
pre-crisis period. 
 
Huang et al. (2009) find results consistent with their theory that the positive impact of 
derivatives usage is higher for firms with lower quality of corporate governance, while 
the negative effect of earnings management is also stronger. To extend the literature on 
this subject, an aligned hypothesis is stated below and tested empirically.    
 
H3: During the sample period (2005 - 2009), sample firms with below-median percentage 
of independent board members experience a higher hedging premium, but a stronger 
value erosion from earnings management. 
 
The data and empirical methodology used to test these hypotheses are described the next 
chapter.  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the data used in this study and the research methods applied in 
order to validate the hypotheses formed in the previous section. The purpose of the study 
is to investigate the impact of real income smoothing and artificial income smoothing on 
firm performance during the global financial crisis of 2008−2009.  
  
 
4.1. Data and Sample 
 
This study uses a sample of firms that were a part of the S&P 500 index at the end of year 
2005. The U.S. stock market is the largest in the world and the constituents of S&P 500 
make up approx. 80 % of the U.S. market capitalization, which enhances the applicability 
of the results achieved in the research. Furthermore, firm-specific data is widely available 
on the S&P 500 firms. Following previous studies on the subject (Huang et al. 2009; 
Allayannis & Weston 2001), financial firms and public utilities are excluded from the 
sample; financial firms being market makers in derivatives and public utility firms being 
heavily regulated may result in biased results. Due to the primary objective of studying 
the impact of derivatives usage and earnings management on stock performance during 
the financial crisis, data on this sample is collected for the period 2004−2009. This period 
of 6 years allows for a comparison of results between the pre-crisis period (2005−2007) 
and the crisis period (2008−2009). During the crisis period, the stock market experienced 
a free-fall, with impacts spilling over the global stock market. Firms with missing data 
points on important variables are excluded from the sample, along with firms that were 
delisted from the constituent index during the sample period. The final sample includes 
297 firms and 1782 firm-year observations.  
 
Derivatives usage is one of the main variables of interest in this study, and is represented 
by a dummy variable indicating use of financial derivatives to hedge foreign currency 
exchange risk, interest rate risk or commodity price risk. During the sample period, 
publicly listed firms were not obliged to report the notional amount or the fair value of 
outstanding derivative contracts in their 10-k filings, which is why the firms’ decision to 
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use derivatives is used in this study instead. This information is collected manually for 
the sample firms from their 10-k filings with the Security and Exchange Commission. 
Stock price data used to calculate the compounded monthly returns is gathered from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream database, while other firm-specific data is gathered from 
the Worldscope database. The research also uses corporate governance variables, such as 
the proportion of independent board members during a specific year, and this information 
is accessed through the Institutional Shareholders Services.  
 
Although the primary dependent variable in this research is the compounded monthly 
stock return, the main analyses are also done using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. 
All dependent variables, independent variables and control variables used in the study are 
described below.  
 
Stock Return: This is the primary dependent variable and refers to the compounded 
monthly stock return for a firm during a year. The formula for calculating the 
compounded return is as follows: 
 
(3) (∏ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
1
𝑛 =  √𝑥1𝑥2⋯𝑥𝑛
𝑛  
where: 
𝑥1, 𝑥2⋯ = Stock returns for each period  
𝑛 = Number of periods  
 
The compounded return is the geometric average of the monthly returns during the year, 
implicating that the number of periods equals 12.  
 
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is a widely used proxy for a firm’s market value and performance. 
This research uses the modification of Tobin’s Q that is calculated as the sum of a firm’s 
market capitalization and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets. 
Due to high skewness in the respective data points, the natural logarithm of this variable 
is used in the regressions, which also makes the interpretation of results more intuitive. 
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Hedger: Dummy variable indicating whether a firm used derivatives to hedge financial 
risk during a specific year or not. The variable equals 1 if the firm explicitly discloses in 
its 10-k report that derivatives were used during the financial year or if the reported 
notional/fair value of outstanding derivatives is non-zero. Consequently, if derivatives 
usage for a year is found to be null, the variable holds a value of 0 for the specific year. 
As mentioned earlier, if no clear information is found, the firm is removed from the 
research sample in order to avoid misrepresentation. 
 
Discretionary Accruals (D. Accruals): Discretionary Accruals is the second important 
independent variable in the study, proxying for earnings management during a year. High 
earnings management is connected to lower firm performance, and literature has shown 
a significant relationship between discretionary accruals and derivatives usage, although 
the direction of this relationship is an currently an open research question. (Lin et al. 2014; 
Barton 2001; Pincus & Rajgopal 2002.) Following Huang et al. (2009), the absolute value 
of the discretionary accruals, calculated using the Modified Jones Model, which has been 
explained in the section 2.2. is used in this study. 
 
Total Assets: Total assets refers to the book value of total assets of a firm at the end of a 
specific year. Scientific literature on the relationship between firm size and firm 
value/performance has shown mixed results achieved using varied sample of firms and 
periods. Further, larger firms are more likely to use derivatives as hedging instruments. 
(Allayannis & Weston 2001; Jin & Jorion 2006.) As a control variable, the natural 
logarithm of Total Assets of a firm at the end of the year is used. 
 
Return on Assets: Based on previous literature, profitability has a positive relationship 
with firm performance (Allayannis & Weston 2009; Panaretou 2014). Return on Assets 
is often used as a measure of profitability and is calculated as net income during a year 
divided by average total assets, transformed into percentage form. 
 
Return on Equity: As an alternative measure of profitability, return on equity is used in 
certain regression models. It is calculated as net income during the year divided by 
average total equity, transformed into percentage form. 
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Leverage: Based on similar previous studies, leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-
term debt to total equity at the end of the year. Capital structure of a firm is likely to have 
a negative impact on firm value, and based on theoretical literature, firms with high 
leverage are more likely to use derivatives in order to lower their financial debt costs 
(Huang et al. 2009). 
 
Geographical Diversification (Foreign Sales): Following Panaretou (2014), as a proxy 
for geographical diversification, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales of a firm during 
the year is used to control for the impact of exposure to foreign currency and economic 
exposure on the decision to use financial derivatives, as well as the performance in the 
stock market. (Allayannis & Weston 2001; Panaretou 2014.) 
 
Capital Expenditure to Sales ratio (Capex-to-Sales): The ratio of a firm’s capital 
expenditure during the year to its net sales is used to control for the relationship between 
hedging using derivatives and investment opportunities (Allayannis & Weston 2001).   
 
Dividend Payer: Firms with low access to financing are more likely to invest in projects 
with relatively high net present value. To proxy for access to financing from the capital 
markets, a dummy variable indicating dividend payment during the year is used. If a firm 
paid dividends during the year, the variable is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. A dividend 
paying firm is less probable to be financially constrained. (Allayannis & Weston 2001; 
Jin & Jorion 2006.) 
 
Board independence: Huang et al. 2009 find a significant intermediary effect of corporate 
governance on the relationship between hedging using derivatives and firm value. This 
variable represents the percentage of strictly independent board members of a firm at the 
end of the year.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 shows the proportion of firms in the sample that used financial derivatives in each 
year during the period 2004 - 2009. The number of firms that hedged financial risk by 
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using derivatives increased steadily during 2005 - 2009, with the number dropping 
slightly in 2005 compared to 2004. The minimum proportion of hedgers can be observed 
in the year 2005 at approx. 87 % and the highest in the year 2009 at 90 %. This ratio of 
hedgers to non-hedgers is relatively higher than the one reported by studies done using a 
sample period starting from year 1990s (Allayannis & Weston (2001)), but more aligned 
with the derivative usage of 86.88 % observed by Pararetou (2014) in FTSE 350 firms 
during the years 2003 - 2010.  
 
Table 2. Proportion of Hedgers during the Sample Period 
 
 YEAR   
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Non-Hedgers 37 40 36 33 30 29 
(%) 12.50 13.47 12.12 11.11 10.10 9.76 
Hedgers 259 257 261 264 267 268 
(%) 87.50 86.53 87.88 88.89 89.90 90.24 
Total 296 297 297 297 297 297 
 
 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for all the variables used in the research analyses 
for the whole sample period, the pre-crisis period and the crisis period, separately.  The 
mean compounded monthly stock return during the pre-crisis period is 0.36 %, while the 
return during the crisis period is -0.73 %, with the standard deviation during the crisis 
being relatively high at 5.13. This shows that the variation in firms’ performance 
increased during the economic downturn, which is an interesting phenomenon to be 
explored. The compounded monthly return on the S&P 500 index during the pre-crisis 
period is approx. similar to the one observed by the sample firms, but in the crisis period, 
the index experienced a compounded monthly return of -1.09 %, which is 39 basis points 
lower than the return on the sample firms. This may be due to the fact that financial firms, 
which suffered a greater impact of the financial crisis, have been removed from the 
sample. Tobin’s Q, an alternative measure of firm value and performance, also shows 
similar characteristics as the stock return measure. The mean Tobin’s Q during the pre-
crisis period is 2.28 and during the crisis period is 1.67, indicating that sample firms 
experienced a drop in market valuation during the global financial crisis.  
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The measure of earnings management, discretionary accruals, has a maximum value of 
0.93 during the pre-crisis period, whereas the maximum value during the crisis period is 
observed to be 0.46. This observation is consistent with the results depicted by Arthur, 
Tang & Lin (2015), which indicated that the level of earnings management by firms 
decreased during the crisis period. The mean leverage ratio of firms decreased slightly 
during the crisis period from 0.70 to 0.68, indicating lower access to financing as well as 
potentially lower risk taking behaviour by corporations. Average profitability of firms 
dropped significantly when looking at the return on assets and return on equity values. 
The mean return on assets dropped from 7.97 % in the pre-crisis period to 4.53 % in the 
crisis period, while the mean return on equity dropped from 0.23 % to -0.06 %. The level 
of foreign sales during the crisis period is seen to be higher than in the pre-crisis period, 
meaning that firms took a measure to reduce the impact of the financial crisis, which was 
majorly observed in the U.S., by increasing their exposure to international markets. The 
percentage of independent board members on the sample firms’ boards increased during 
the crisis period based on the median values, being 44.4 % in the pre-crisis period and 
53.8 % in the crisis period. The improved corporate governance during the crisis may be 
an indication of the effort by corporates to reduce agency costs and increase market 
confidence during the uncertain economic circumstances. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
Whole Sample 
     N   Mean   Median   min   max   St. Dev 
 Ln (Total Assets) 1782 16.11 16.02 12.69 20.50 1.16 
 Avg. Monthly Stock Return (%) 1780 0.18 0.55 -10.21 8.37 3.25 
 Avg. Monthly SP500 Return (%) 1782 0.06 0.60 -3.97 1.78 1.87 
 Tobin’s Q 1781 2.07 1.74 0.46 10.76 1.16 
 Hedger 1781 0.88 1.00 0 1 0.32 
 Discretionary Accruals 1479 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.93 0.06 
 Leverage 1782 0.69 0.38 -103.62 88.35 4.07 
 Capex-to-Sales 1779 0.07 0.04 0.00 2.01 0.12 
 Return on Equity (%) 1479 0.11 0.17 -52.30 34.21 1.91 
 Return on Assets (%) 1479 6.60 7.14 -68.62 33.24 8.98 
 Foreign Sales (%) 1680 36.10 37.47 0.00 138.28 24.77 
 Dividend Payment 1777 0.73 1.00 0 1 0.44 
 Board Independence (%) 1501 44.17 50.00 0.00 94.12 26.78 
Before Crisis 
     N   Mean   Median   min   max   St. Dev 
 Ln (Total Assets) 1188 16.06 15.97 13.14 20.49 1.15 
 Avg. Monthly Stock Return (%) 1186 0.65 0.72 -9.98 12.55 2.22 
 Avg. Monthly SP500 Return (%) 1188 0.64 0.60 0.29 1.07 0.29 
 Tobin’s Q 1187 2.28 1.91 0.67 10.76 1.27 
 Hedger 1187 0.88 1.00 0 1 0.33 
 Discretionary Accruals 888 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.93 0.06 
 Leverage 1188 0.70 0.35 -12.60 88.35 3.25 
 Capex-to-Sales 1187 0.07 0.04 0.00 2.01 0.12 
 Return on Equity (%) 888 0.23 0.18 -2.39 34.21 1.20 
 Return on Assets (%) 888 7.97 8.01 -68.62 33.24 7.56 
 Foreign Sales (%) 1112 35.27 35.72 0.00 138.28 24.41 
 Dividend Payment 1186 0.73 1.00 0 1 0.44 
 Board Independence (%) 972 38.87 44.44 0.00 94.12 29.12 
Crisis Period 
     N   Mean   Median   min   max   St. Dev 
 Ln (Total Assets) 594 16.19 16.13 12.69 20.50 1.17 
 Avg. Monthly Stock Return (%) 594 -0.73 -0.41 -21.61 27.66 5.13 
 Avg. Monthly SP500 Return (%) 594 -1.09 -1.09 -3.97 1.78 2.88 
 Tobin’s Q 594 1.67 1.46 0.46 7.04 0.78 
 Hedger 594 0.90 1.00 0 1 0.30 
 Discretionary Accruals 591 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.46 0.06 
 Leverage 594 0.68 0.47 -103.62 46.39 5.35 
 Capex-to-Sales 592 0.07 0.04 0.00 1.45 0.12 
 Return on Equity (%) 591 -0.06 0.14 -52.30 6.93 2.62 
 Return on Assets (%) 591 4.53 6.01 -64.62 33.16 10.44 
 Foreign Sales (%) 568 37.73 40.58 0.00 100.00 25.38 
 Dividend Payment 591 0.73 1.00 0 1 0.44 
 Board Independence (%) 529 53.91 53.85 0.00 92.86 18.20 
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4.2. Research Methodology  
 
This section describes the empirical methods used to analyze the data and evaluate the 
validity of the research hypotheses. This study utilizes various types of analyses, 
including correlation analysis, univariate analysis, and multivariate analysis. While 
correlation analysis provides a simple direction and strength of relationship between all 
the variables mentioned earlier, univariate analysis provides a better understanding of the 
mean differences in market performance of firms that use financial derivatives and firms 
that do not, and firms that use higher than mean amount of discretionary accruals and 
firms that use below than mean amount of discretionary accruals. In order to extend the 
research to include both the independent variables - the decision to hedge and the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals, as well as include control variables that affect firm 
performance and/or artificial and real income smoothing, multivariate regression analyses 
are performed.  
 
4.2.1. Test of Multicollinearity  
 
In order to avoid obtaining biased estimates from the regression models used in this study, 
a test of multicollinearity among the independent variables involved is done following 
Panaretou (2014), by using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. Woolridge (2012: 
97-98) states that a VIF value above 10 is considered to be the threshold for considering 
the multicollinearity present an estimation problem. As can be observed from Table 4 
below, the maximum VIF value observed i.e. 1.40 is for the variables representing the 
level of discretionary accruals and the return on assets. It can therefore be concluded that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this research. 
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Table 4. Test of Multicollinearity using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
 
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Ln(assets) 1.14 .87 
 Dividend Dummy 1.14 .88 
 D. Accruals 1.40 .71 
 Hedger 1.05 .95 
 Capex-to-Sales 1.02 .98 
 Leverage 1.02 .98 
 Return on Assets 1.40 .71 
 Foreign Sales 1.06 .95 
 Mean VIF 1.15  
 
 
4.2.2. Hausman Test 
 
Previous studies investigating the impact of income smoothing on firm performance have 
used various types of regression models, but the most commonly used models are Pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled OLS), Random Generalized Least Squares and Fixed 
Effects Generalized Least Squares (FEGLS). Bartlett & Partnoy (2018) mention that a 
fixed-effects estimation model produces the most accurate results when the dependent 
variable is a measure based on stock returns. Further, using a fixed-effects model also 
helps in avoiding omitted bias, and thus also endogeneity problem. However, in order to 
formally choose between the random-effects model and the fixed-effects model, 
Hausman test is performed. According to Woolridge (2012: 290), Hausman test simply 
tests for the statistically significant differences in the estimates on the time variant 
independent variables. The null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that the coefficients 
obtained from the random-effects model are consistent. In case the p-value from the test 
is less than 0.05, this null hypothesis can be rejected, implying that fixed-effects model is 
the appropriate model to use with the data. (Woolridge 2012.) The results from the 
Hausman test, presented below in Table 5, reject the null hypothesis of consistent random-
effects model’s coefficients at a very high level of statistical significance. Thus, fixed-
effects model is considered to be the correct regression model for the purpose of this 
study. Due to the fact that Pooled OLS model is used extensively in addition to either 
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random-effects model or fixed-effects model in previous similar research, this study also 
uses Pooled OLS in the main regressions in addition to the fixed-effects model.  
 
Table 5. Hausman Test for Fixed-effects vs. Random-effects Model 
 
 Fixed effects Random effects Difference Standard Error 
Hedger 0.728 0.169 0.560 0.539 
D. Accruals 0.718 0.541 0.176 1.41 
Ln (assets) -1.382 0.051 -1.433 0.395 
Return on Assets 0.070 0.066 0.002 0.014 
Leverage -0.099 -0.074 -0.025 0.013 
Foreign Sales 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.013 
Capex-to-Sales -5.788 0.328 -6.116 1.634 
Dividend Payer -1.652 -0.328 -1.324 0.570 
     
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Prob>chi2: 0.000 
 
 
4.2.3. Regression Models 
 
To identify the impact of artificial and real income smoothing devices on firm 
performance, several regression models are estimated based on previous literature using 
the collected data on 297 non-financial firms listed on the S&P 500 index during the 
period between 2005 and 2009. The regression models are performed on the whole 
sample of firms during the whole period of 5 years, or on various sub-samples formed on 
the basis of research hypotheses and previous studies, depending on the substance of 
interest. Furthermore, in cases where Pooled OLS method is used, industry and year 
dummies are included in the regression models in order to control for industry-specific 
and time-specific effects, whereas only year dummy variables are included in fixed-
effects regressions, as required. Most of the regressions estimated in this study as 
discussed below include control variables that have been used trying to investigate similar 
relationships in the past. These variables, as described in the previous sections, are related 
to firm size, profitability, leverage, capital expenditure, geographical diversification, and 
dividend payment.  
 
The first regression model aims to analyze the impact of using financial derivatives on 
compounded monthly stock returns of sample firms. It includes the above mentioned 
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control variables (contemporaneous) and is performed on the sample firms for the pre-
crisis period (2005 - 2007), crisis period (2008 - 2009) and the whole period (2005 - 
2009). To identify whether larger firms derive a larger benefit from using financial 
derivatives due to lower cost of establishing risk management practices, the regression is 
further done on a sub-sample of firms with above-median amount of total assets during a 
given year. 
 
(4) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 
0
+ 
1
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 
2
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 
3
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +

4
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 
5
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 
6
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 
7
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 
 
Next, the measure of earnings management, the absolute amount of discretionary 
accruals, is added to the first regression model. This model is also run on the sample firms 
for all three periods, and also separately on the sub-sample of firms with above-median 
total assets. Further, to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the relationship 
between income smoothing devices and firm performance, the regression is run separately 
on firms with below-median percentage of independent board members and firms with 
above-median percentage of independent board members.  
 
(5) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 
0
+ 
1
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 
2
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 +

3
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 
4
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 
5
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 
6
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 +

7
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 
8
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 
 
Toerien & Lambrechts (2016), in their study aiming to investigate the impact of 
derivatives hedging on firm performance, observe different coefficients when using 
return on assets and return on equity as measures of firm performance. In order to evaluate 
whether the measure of profitability in this study has an impact on the results obtained by 
the (5) regression model, which is of primary concern, the regression is also done using 
return on equity instead of return on assets, as presented in the model below.  
 
57 
 
(6) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 = 
0
+ 
1
𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 
2
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 +

3
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 
4
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 
5
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 
6
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 +

7
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑜𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 
8
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 
 
The results from the correlation, univariate and multivariate analyses are presented and 
discussed in the following chapter.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results obtained from the different analyses performed using the 
data and methodology described in earlier chapters. The chapter is divided into three sub-
sections discussing the results from the correlation analysis, univariate analyses, and 
multivariate analyses, in the respective order. 
 
 
5.1. Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 6 displays the correlation coefficients from the correlation analysis between the 
main independent and control variables used in the study. In addition, the correlation 
between the firm performance measure used in this study, compounded monthly stock 
returns during the year, and Tobin’s Q, a measure widely used in similar studies, is 
reported. The coefficient for this relationship is positive and statistically significant, 
validating the use of an alternative measure of firm performance. The correlation between 
Stock Return and Hedger is observed to be positive, but low in magnitude and statistical 
significance, but interestingly, the correlation between Tobin’s Q and Hedger is negative 
and statistical significant. The latter result may be due to the inherent conceptual and 
computation error in the use of simple Tobin’s Q, as explained in the previous chapters. 
The coefficient of correlation between Discretionary Accruals (D. Accruals) and Stock 
Return is negative and significant at the 5 % level, which is in line with the primary 
alternative hypothesis of this study. The relationship between firm size and firm 
performance has been a subject of debate. Indeed, the relationship between Assets and 
Stock return is positive and statistically insignificant, but between Assets and Tobin’s Q 
is negative and statistically significant. Leverage and Stock Return are negatively 
correlated, and so are Dividend Payer and Stock Return (although statistically 
insignificant). The measure of profitability, Return on Assets, is positively and 
statistically significantly correlated to Stock Return, as expected.  
 
Hedger is positively correlated to Assets, implying that larger firms are more likely to use 
financial derivatives, which is contradicting the theory of financial distress, but in line 
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with the theory that larger firms have lower costs of setting up risk management practices. 
The relationship between Leverage and Hedger is positive but insignificant. Based on the 
coefficient reported, firms with higher level of foreign sales are more likely to be hedgers. 
The correlation between Discretionary Accruals and Assets is found to be negative. All 
independent and control variables have a relatively low level of correlation among each 
other, providing a reliable basis for extending the analysis.  
 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables 
Stock 
Return 
Ln  
(Tobin Q) 
Hedger D. 
Accruals 
Ln 
(Assets) 
Leverage Return 
on Assets 
Foreign 
Sales 
Dividend 
Payer 
  
  Stock Return 1.000 
  Ln (Tobin’s Q) 0.324* 1.000 
  Hedger 0.004 -0.088* 1.000 
  D. Accruals -0.094* -0.065* -0.016 1.000 
  Ln (Assets) 0.018 -0.177* 0.134* -0.116* 1.000 
  Leverage -0.126* -0.060* 0.025 0.015 -0.038 1.000 
  Return on Assets 0.153* 0.580* -0.066* -0.508* 0.056* -0.084* 1.000 
  Foreign Sales 0.022 0.267* 0.119* 0.041 -0.043 -0.079* 0.102* 1.000 
  Dividend Payer -0.020 -0.108* 0.069* -0.182* 0.304* -0.007 0.131* -0.085* 1.000 
 
* shows significance at the .05 level  
 
 
5.2. Univariate Analysis  
 
Univariate analysis is done on the sample firms separately for determining the differences 
in mean Stock Return between Hedgers and Non-hedgers, and between firms with Low 
and High Discretionary Accruals during the three different estimate periods - Pre-crisis 
period, Crisis period and the whole period. Table 7 provides the results of the two 
univariate analyses in separate panels.  
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Table 7. Univariate Analysis  
 
Panel A. Hedger vs. Non-hedger Whole Period Before Crisis Crisis Period 
Stock Return 
All firms All firms All firms Small firms 
  N    Mean    N    Mean    N  Mean    N Mean 
Non-hedger 168 -.038 109 .306 59 -.673 37 -.851 
Hedger 1317 .013 782 .499 535 -.699 260 -.498 
Difference  -.051  -.193  .026  -.352 
t-stat  -.15  -.85  .05  -.35 
p-value  .869  .393  .971  -.713 
 
Panel B. Low vs. High 
Discretionary Accruals 
Whole Period Before Crisis Crisis Period 
Stock Return 
All firms All firms All firms Small firms 
  N    Mean    N    Mean    N  Mean    N Mean 
Low Discretionary Accruals 1005 .033 592 .515 413 -.659 194 -.652 
High Discretionary Accruals 480 -.048 299 .397 181 -.781 103 -.337 
Difference  .081  .119  .122  -.315 
t-stat  .4  .75  .25  -.45 
p-value  .696  .448  .789  .636 
 
 
Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of the mean differences in Stock Return observed 
by to sub-samples of firms - firms that used financial derivatives during the period, and 
firms that did not. The results for the period 2005 - 2009 indicate that hedgers experienced 
a higher mean compounded monthly stock return than non-hedgers, the mean difference 
between the two sub-samples being .051 %. The result is similar for the period before the 
crisis with a difference between the samples’ mean of .193. However, during the crisis 
period, the result is opposite i.e. hedgers experienced a lower compounded monthly stock 
return than non-hedgers, which is contradictory to the research hypothesis. However, 
when comparing the means during the same period for firms that are relatively small in 
size (below-median amount of total assets), hedgers appear to have performed better than 
non-hedgers. This observation is consistent with the theory of financial distress that 
proposes higher hedging premiums for small firms.  
 
The mean differences in Stock Return for firms with low (below-mean) discretionary 
accruals and high (above-mean) discretionary accruals are presented in Panel B of Table 
7. During the whole sample period of 2005 - 2009, firms that used a lower level of 
artificial income smoothing through accrual management observed a higher compounded 
monthly stock return during the years than firms that were more aggressive artificial 
income smoothers. The mean differences in the stock returns is reported to be .081. 
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Similarly, firms with lower level of discretionary accruals performed better by a 
difference in the stock returns of .119 during the pre-crisis period and .122 during the 
crisis period. However, when comparing the means for firms of below-median size in 
terms of total assets, firms with higher level of discretionary accruals are reported to be 
better performers during the crisis period. It is important to note that the results of this 
univariate analysis are not statistically significant and similar results are observed for the 
differences in median tests. The potential relationships should be tested further by using 
more sophisticated empirical research techniques, as is done in this study through 
multivariate regression models.  
 
 
5.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 
This section reports the results of the multivariate regression analyses performed on the 
sample data in order to identify the impact of artificial and real income smoothing on firm 
performance. Various regressions are run using different subsets of data concerning 
specific types of firms and particular time periods.  
 
5.3.1. Hedging and Firm Performance 
 
Table 8 reports the results from the regressions aiming to identify the impact of using 
derivatives on compounded monthly stock returns of sample firms during the pre-crisis 
period (2005 - 2007), crisis period (2008 - 2009) and the whole period (2005 - 2009). The 
main variable of interest in the six regression models reported is Hedger, which is the 
binary variable indicating whether a firm used financial derivatives or not. The table 
reports the regression results using Pooled OLS as well as Fixed-effects model.  
 
Hedging: The regressions on sample firms for the whole period result in a positive but 
statistically insignificant coefficient on Hedger. The coefficient obtained by employing 
Pooled OLS is comparatively smaller (0.167) than the one by Fixed-effects model 
(0.730). In the pre-crisis period, Pooled OLS leads to a positive coefficient (0.041), 
whereas Fixed-effects model leads to a negative coefficient (-0.737), although the 
62 
 
coefficients are not statistically significant. In the crisis period, both models result in 
positive coefficients, but Fixed-effects estimation provides a higher and statistically 
significant coefficient of 3.489, implying that firms that used financial derivatives during 
the crisis period experienced, on average, a compounded monthly stock return 3.5 
percentage points higher than firms that did not use financial derivatives. This result 
concerning a positive hedging premium is consistent with Hypothesis 1a and also with 
previous studies, such as Nelson et al. (2005) and Bartram et al. (2011).  
 
Firm Size: The regressions for the whole period result in opposite coefficients for the 
measure of size, natural logarithm of the amount of total assets. While the Pooled OLS 
regression leads to a positive coefficient, the Fixed-effects model leads to a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of -1.379. The results in the pre-crisis and crisis period 
are strikingly opposite to each other regardless of the type of regression model. For the 
pre-crisis period, positive and significant coefficients of 0.203 and 1.882 are obtained 
from the Pooled OLS and Fixed-effects model respectively, whereas in the crisis period, 
negative and significant coefficients of -0.172 and -.6.625 are observed.  
 
Profitability: The regression coefficients for Return on Assets, the measure of 
profitability used in the models, are all positive and largely statistically significant at the 
5 % level for all different regression periods. This result is in line with the expectations 
and similar to what has been reported by other studies (Panaretou 2014; Allayannis & 
Weston 2001) in the past. It is important to note that during the pre-crisis period, the 
coefficients are on average, larger than during the crisis period, ranging from 0.046 to 
0.076.  
 
Leverage: As found in similar previous literature (Huang et al. 2009; Panaretou 2014), 
the regressions lead to negative and mostly statistically significant coefficients on the 
ratio of long-term debt to total equity. The coefficients observed during the crisis period 
are lower and of larger statistical significance and during the pre-crisis period. The Fixed-
effects model leads to a coefficient of -0.113 during the crisis period, while the Pooled 
OLS model to a coefficient of -0.063.  
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Geographical Diversification: During the pre-crisis period, a positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficient is obtained for the measure of geographical diversification, 
whereas in the crisis period, the coefficient using Pooled OLS method is negative. 
Panaretou (2014) also reports insignificant relationship between the level of foreign sales 
and Tobin’s Q for listed firms in the United Kingdom 
 
Capital Expenditure: During the pre-crisis period, the ratio of capital expenditures to net 
sales is observed to be negatively related to firm performance using the Pooled OLS 
method, but positively related using the Fixed-effects model. Mixed results have been 
observed by previous studies, such as Carter & Simkins (2006). Such relationships are 
also observed for the crisis period as well as the whole sample period in this study, but 
the coefficient obtained using the Fixed-effects model during the whole period is -0.580 
and statistically significant.  
 
Dividend Payment: During the pre-crisis period, negative yet statistically insignificant 
coefficients are observed on the binary variable indicating whether a firm paid dividends 
during the year or not. However, during the crisis period, the Fixed-effects model 
provides a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -4.292. This negative 
relationship between firm performance and dividend payment is also reported by 
Allayannis & Weston (2001).  
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Table 8. Hedging and Firm Performance 
 
 Before Crisis Crisis Period  Whole Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: 
Stock Return 
Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects 
              
Constant -2.708*** -29.615*** -1.969 126.777*** -0.127 22.831*** 
 (-2.756) (-3.582) (0.973) (3.577) (-0.124) (2.976) 
Hedger 0.041 -0.737 0.248 3.489* 0.167 0.730 
 (0.156) (-1.242) (0.540) (1.944) (0.648) (1.641) 
Ln(assets) 0.203*** 1.882*** -0.172 -6.625*** 0.036 -1.379*** 
 (3.230) (3.755) (-1.536) (-3.537) (0.559) (-2.826) 
Return on Assets 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.046*** 0.058* 0.062*** 0.064*** 
 (5.790) (3.915) (3.094) (1.828) (5.302) (3.515) 
Leverage -0.053* -0.050 -0.063*** -0.113*** -0.074*** -0.099*** 
 (-1.653) (-1.147) (-4.284) (-3.652) (-3.548) (-7.522) 
Foreign Sales 0.003 0.019 -0.001 0.044 0.001 0.010 
 (0.708) (1.247) (-0.128) (0.856) (0.286) (0.975) 
Capex-to-Sales -1.071* -0.616 1.028 -3.725 0.063 -5.804** 
 (-1.704) (-0.306) (0.685) (-0.717) (0.031) (-1.988) 
Dividend Payer -0.393* -0.786 -0.185 -4.292** -0.421* -1.649** 
 (-1.766) (-1.001) (-0.523) (-2.347) (-1.778) (-2.218) 
       
Observations 835 835 567 567 1,402 1,402 
R-squared 0.171 0.108 0.660 0.717 0.504 0.532 
Number of firms   284   287   290 
*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. Robust t-stats reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Hedging and Firm Performance in Large Firms 
 
Table 9 shows the results for the same regressions as above performed on the sample of 
firms that have above-median amount of total assets, representing relatively large firms 
in the sample.  
 
Hedger: The resulting coefficients on Hedger are largely statistically insignificant, except 
for the positive and highly statistically significant coefficient observed for the sample 
firms during the crisis period. The result is in line with Hypothesis 1a, in that it indicates 
a hedging premium during the time of the global financial crisis, but not during the period 
following the crisis. Further, the coefficient of 5.426 is larger than the one observed when 
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all the firms in the sample are used in the regression analysis. This result suggests that 
larger firms derive higher benefits from hedging using financial derivatives owing to 
economies of scale and lower initial costs of establishing risk management frameworks. 
Clark & Mefteh (2010) report a similar result concerning a higher hedging premium for 
larger firms. Nelson et al. (2005) also find that the abnormal stock return from hedging 
using financial derivatives is mostly concentrated in large firms in the United States 
during the period 1995-1999.  
 
Firm Size: The regressions for the pre-crisis period using the sample of large firms lead 
to a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient on the measure of firm size use the 
Pooled OLS method, but a positive and significant coefficient of 1.682 using the Fixed-
effects method. This coefficient is slightly larger than the one observed for the estimation 
sample of all firms. However, for the period representing the crisis, a negative coefficient 
of low statistical significance is observed, whereas a negative coefficient of -1.482 (5 % 
significance level) is obtained with the regression on the whole sample period. Clearly, 
the relationship between firm size and firm performance is dependent on various factors, 
providing mixed results in most studies. 
 
Profitability: The coefficients resulting from the respective regressions on Return on 
Assets are of the same magnitude and direction as obtained from the first set of 
regressions. However, the coefficients from the Fixed-effects model are of lower 
significance than observed previously, implying that for larger firms, profitability alone 
may not be as important determinant of market performance. This result is opposite to the 
one reported by Clark & Mefteh (2010). 
Leverage: The impact of leverage on firm performance for larger firms in the sample is 
observed to be relatively similar as on the whole sample for firms i.e. negative. However, 
for the subset of larger firms, the relationship is seen to be of low statistical significance.  
 
Geographical Diversification: While for the whole sample of firms no significant 
relationship is found between the level of foreign sales and firm performance, a positive 
relationship is found between the variables on the sample of large firms during the pre-
crisis period.  
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Based on the results of these regressions, capital expenditure and dividend payment do 
not have an impact on firm performance for large firms. Previous studies, such as 
Allayannis & Weston (2001) and Panaretou (2014) also find no statistically significant 
impact of investment opportunities and dividend payment on firm performance. 
 
Table 9. Hedging and Firm Performance - Firms with Total Assets > median value of 
Total Assets  
 
 Before Crisis Crisis Period  Whole Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stock Return Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects 
              
Constant 1.397 -29.421*** -0.448 109.197* 2.466 24.289** 
 (0.758) (-3.503) (-0.121) (1.695) (1.348) (1.983) 
Hedger 0.247 -0.254 -0.156 5.426*** -0.063 0.507 
 
(0.714) (-0.491) (-0.199) (2.788) (-0.157) (0.882) 
Ln(assets) -0.065 1.682*** -0.247 -7.229* -0.115 -1.482** 
 
(-0.587) (3.437) (-1.139) (-1.886) (-1.089) (-2.017) 
Return on Assets 0.071*** 0.039 0.064** 0.098 0.073*** 0.078* 
 
(2.819) (1.173) (2.051) (1.175) (3.474) (1.807) 
Leverage -0.059 -0.146 -0.109*** -0.168*** -0.096*** -0.117*** 
 
(-0.793) (-1.573) (-5.369) (-5.969) (-4.674) (-12.152) 
Foreign Sales -0.002 0.035** -0.002 0.126 -0.003 0.016 
 
(-0.499) (2.408) (-0.277) (1.033) (-0.780) (1.559) 
Capex-to-Sales -1.198* 1.354 2.686 -6.117 0.259 -3.513 
 
(-1.735) (1.464) (0.499) (-0.796) (0.119) (-1.523) 
Dividend Payer -0.227 0.312 0.084 0.700 -0.167 0.276 
 
(-0.657) (0.555) (0.107) (0.263) (-0.396) (0.485) 
 
      
Observations 429 429 291 291 720 720 
R-squared 0.173 0.061 0.584 0.636 0.502 0.541 
Number of firms   157   152   169 
*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. Robust t-stats reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
5.3.3. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance 
 
The regressions from Table 10 and Table 11 aim to identify the impact of artificial and 
real income smoothing on firm performance using two different control variables 
concerning firm profitability (refer to section 4.2.3.). 
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Regressions using Return on Assets as a Control Variable for Firm Profitability 
 
As mentioned earlier, previous studies have reported a significant relationship between 
discretionary accruals and firm performance (Tang & Chang 2014) as well mixed results 
on the relationship between discretionary accruals and usage of financial derivatives 
(Barton 2001). Therefore, this study builds on these empirical findings along with the 
theoretical literature on the simultaneous impacts of artificial and real income smoothing.  
 
Hedging: The Pooled OLS regression for the pre-crisis period leads to a positive but 
statistically insignificant coefficient on Hedger, whereas the Fixed-effects model to a 
negative and insignificant coefficient. However, for the crisis period, both models result 
in a positive coefficient with the result from the Fixed-effects model being statistically 
significant at the 5 % level. The coefficient of 3.702 implies a 3.7 percentage points higher 
compounded monthly stock return for hedgers during the crisis year. Based on these 
results, Hypothesis 2 can be accepted, suggesting than hedging has a positive and 
significant impact on firm performance during the crisis period, but not during the pre-
crisis period. The result is in line with Bartram et al. (2011), who find that firms hedge 
downside risk using financial derivatives. The regressions for the whole sample period 
result in positive but statistically insignificant coefficients. 
 
Discretionary Accruals: While the coefficients obtained from the regressions concerning 
the pre-crisis period are positive and statistically insignificant, the coefficients from the 
crisis period regressions are negative, with a coefficient of -6.506 from the Fixed-effects 
model. The regressions for the whole sample period lead to positive yet statistically 
insignificant results for the relationship between artificial income smoothing and firm 
performance.  
 
Firm size: The regressions for the pre-crisis period result in positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on the measure of firm size, whereas negative and statistically 
significant coefficient is observed on the respective variable for the crisis period using 
the Fixed-effects model. Similar result is obtained from the Fixed-effects model for the 
whole sample period.  
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Profitability: The regressions for all periods largely result in positive and statistically 
significant coefficients on the measure of profitability - Return on Assets, except for the 
Fixed-effects regression for the crisis period.  
 
Leverage: For the pre-crisis period, a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient is 
observed using both regression models. However, for the crisis period of 2008-2009, a 
negative and statistically significant relationship is found between the ratio of long-term 
debt to total equity and firm performance. A similar relationship is suggested by the 
regressions for the period 2005-2009.  
 
While no statistically significant relationship is found between dividend payment and 
firm performance during the pre-crisis period, a negative and statistically significant 
relationship is suggested by the Fixed-effects model for the crisis period, a result that is 
in line with the results reported by previous similar studies. Based on these regressions, 
geographical diversification and the level of capital expenditure are observed to have no 
statistically significant impact on firm performance during any of the sample periods.  
 
Using Return on Equity as a Control Variable for Firm Profitability 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 6, similar regressions with a different measure of profitability 
are performed. Instead of Return on Assets as a control variable, Return on Equity is used. 
The results from these regressions are presented in Table 11.  
 
Hedging: The regressions of firm performance on hedging variable and discretionary 
accruals using Return on Equity as a control variable for profitability lead to a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient of 4.374 on Hedger for the crisis period using the 
Fixed-effects model. For the other sample periods, the results are not statistically 
significant, similar to the previous regressions.  
 
Discretionary Accruals: While the previous regressions resulted in negative yet 
statistically insignificant coefficients on the measure of artificial income smoothing, the 
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regressions with Return on Equity as an independent variable result in a negative and 
largely statistically significant coefficient for all periods. This result is consistent with the 
one reported by Tang & Chang (2014) and allows for the rejection of null hypothesis 
Hypothesis 0b, in turn for the acceptance of Hypothesis 1b.  
 
The results concerning the control variables obtained from these regressions are similar 
to the ones observed from the regressions employing Return on Assets as the measure of 
profitability. Mixed results are observed for the relationship between firm size and firm 
performance, whereas a negative impact of leverage and dividend payment is seen on 
firm performance for crisis period regressions.  
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Table 10. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance (Return on Assets as 
the measure of firm profitability) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before Crisis Crisis Period  Whole Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stock Returns Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects 
              
Constant -2.893*** -29.499*** -1.872 99.766*** -0.212 22.835*** 
 (-2.835) (-3.555) (-1.041) (3.233) (-0.201) (2.980) 
Hedger 0.053 -0.731 0.245 3.702** 0.172 0.729 
 (0.202) (-1.233) (0.531) (2.036) (0.669) (1.636) 
D. Accruals 1.089 0.607 -0.891 -6.442 0.609 0.718 
 (0.696) (0.234) (-0.332) (-1.207) (0.415) (0.357) 
Ln(assets) 0.209*** 1.871*** -0.172 -6.506*** 0.038 -1.383*** 
 (3.274) (3.717) (-1.533) (-3.403) (0.587) (-2.837) 
Return on Assets 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.042** 0.021 0.065*** 0.068*** 
 (5.503) (2.840) (2.328) (0.494) (4.922) (3.127) 
Leverage -0.052 -0.051 -0.063*** -0.117*** -0.073*** -0.099*** 
 (-1.626) (-1.147) (-4.241) (-3.753) (-3.516) (-7.503) 
Foreign Sales 0.002 0.019 -0.001 0.040 0.001 0.010 
 (0.648) (1.237) (-0.123) (0.801) (0.265) (0.990) 
Capex-to-Sales -1.070* -0.617 1.055 -3.650 0.057 -5.788** 
 (-1.683) (-0.306) (0.705) (-0.706) (0.028) (-1.986) 
Dividend Payer -0.384* -0.776 -0.191 -4.241** -0.416* -1.652** 
 (-1.724) (-0.991) (-0.540) (-2.255) (-1.761) (-2.225) 
       
Observations 835 835 567 567 1,402 1,402 
R-squared 0.171 0.108 0.660 0.719 0.504 0.532 
Number of firms   284   287   290 
*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. Robust t-stats reported in parentheses. 
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Table 11. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance (Return on Equity as 
the measure of firm profitability) 
 
 Before Crisis Crisis Period  Whole Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stock Returns Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects 
              
Constant -1.271 -29.042*** -1.782 117.782*** 0.698 20.053*** 
 (-1.271) (-3.635) (-0.837) (3.370) (0.682) (2.777) 
Hedger -0.087 -0.722 0.233 4.374** 0.037 0.655 
 (-0.328) (-1.173) (0.423) (2.257) (0.139) (1.464) 
D. Accruals -2.753* -4.140** -7.138*** -10.989** -3.967*** -4.206** 
 (-1.765) (-2.150) (-2.708) (-2.338) (-2.801) (-2.407) 
Ln(assets) 0.154** 1.890*** -0.154 -7.531*** 0.021 -1.159** 
 (2.372) (3.907) (-1.158) (-3.462) (0.324) (-2.531) 
Return on Equity 0.062* 0.009 0.016 0.092 0.028 0.024 
 (1.781) (0.214) (0.527) (0.319) (1.128) (0.866) 
Leverage -0.070* -0.050 -0.095*** -0.186*** -0.083*** -0.106*** 
 (-1.876) (-1.009) (-5.198) (-3.521) (-4.098) (-7.623) 
Foreign Sales 0.006* 0.019 0.001 0.050 0.004 0.009 
 (1.663) (1.207) (0.107) (0.896) (1.181) (0.948) 
Capex-to-Sales -1.467** -1.003 2.525 -7.223 -0.116 -6.224** 
 (-2.445) (-0.507) (0.489) (-0.824) (-0.057) (-2.081) 
Dividend Payer -0.250 -0.653 -0.339 -6.835** -0.302 -1.552** 
 (-1.114) (-0.808) (-0.761) (-2.191) (-1.279) (-2.086) 
       
Observations 835 835 567 567 1,402 1,402 
R-squared 0.125 0.085 0.592 0.666 0.489 0.525 
Number of firms   284   287   290 
*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. Robust t-stats reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
5.3.4. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance - Firms with Total assets 
> median value of Total Assets 
 
This section presents the main results from the regressions of firm performance on 
hedging, artificial income smoothing, and control variables for a sample of large firms, 
defined as firms with total asset size more than the median value during a given year. 
These can be seen from Table 12. 
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Hedging: The results concerning the impact of using financial derivatives on firm 
performance are relatively similar to the ones observed for the whole sample, except that 
the coefficient on the variable is higher (5.865) and more statistically significant (at the 1 
% level) during the crisis period. As can be seen, the coefficient is only statistically 
significant for the fixed-effects regression performed on the sample for the crisis period, 
with other coefficients being of low statistical significance. This result confirms that 
larger firms have higher benefits of using financial derivatives during the time of 
uncertainty, consistent with the results reported by Clark & Mefteh (2010) and Nelson et 
al. (2005). 
 
Discretionary Accruals: To recall, no statistically significant relationship was found 
between artificial income and firm performance based on the regressions of firm 
performance on hedging, discretionary accruals and control variables including Return 
on Assets as the measure of profitability, although a negative and significant relationship 
was observed with the same regressions for the crisis period employing Return on Equity. 
However, these regressions performed on a sample of large firms resulted in a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient on the measure of artificial income i.e. the absolute 
amount of discretionary accruals, for the crisis period. This result suggests that larger 
firms experience larger gains from real income smoothing but also larger negative 
consequences of artificial income smoothing.  
 
The regression results concerning the control variables are similar to the ones observed 
earlier, with leverage having a negative impact on compounded monthly stock return, but 
other variables only having coefficients of low statistical significance.  
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Table 12. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance - Firms with Total 
Assets > median value of Total Assets  
 
 Before Crisis Crisis Period Whole Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stock Return Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects Pooled OLS Fixed-effects 
              
Constant 1.361 -29.136*** 0.023 99.114 2.513 24.035* 
 (0.723) (-3.050) (0.006) (1.522) (1.360) (1.949) 
Hedger 0.248 -0.183 -0.210 5.865*** -0.066 0.503 
 (0.716) (-0.388) (-0.263) (2.881) (-0.165) (0.876) 
D. Accruals 0.187 8.309* -4.679 -15.119** -0.305 -2.174 
 (0.079) (1.713) (-1.091) (-2.205) (-0.139) (-0.699) 
Ln(assets) -0.064 1.626*** -0.251 -6.568* -0.117 -1.457* 
 (-0.570) (2.960) (-1.148) (-1.696) (-1.098) (-1.974) 
Return on Assets 0.072*** 0.057 0.048 0.010 0.072*** 0.069 
 (2.736) (1.515) (1.399) (0.122) (3.246) (1.544) 
Leverage -0.059 -0.156 -0.108*** -0.178*** -0.096*** -0.117*** 
 (-0.789) (-1.370) (-5.369) (-6.332) (-4.670) (-12.429) 
Foreign Sales -0.002 0.036** -0.001 0.109 -0.003 0.015 
 (-0.498) (2.548) (-0.139) (0.931) (-0.773) (1.503) 
Capex-to-Sales -1.200* 1.223 2.865 -5.918 0.266 -3.528 
 (-1.728) (1.243) (0.534) (-0.780) (0.122) (-1.525) 
Dividend Payer -0.225 0.470 0.037 0.990 -0.169 0.288 
 (-0.652) (0.696) (0.047) (0.367) (-0.403) (0.488) 
       
Observations 429 429 291 291 720 720 
R-squared 0.173 0.080 0.586 0.645 0.502 0.541 
Number of firms   157   152   169 
*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. Robust t-stats reported in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
5.3.5. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance - The role of Corporate 
Governance 
 
Table 13 presents the results concerning the role of corporate governance in the market 
value gained / lost from artificial and real income smoothing devices. As mentioned 
earlier, this study uses the percentage of independent board members in a firm as the 
measure of the quality of corporate governance, as done on various previous studies 
(Huang et al. 2009).  
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Based on the results presented in Table 11, the impact of using financial derivatives 
during the pre-crisis period on firm performance is negative for firms with above-median 
proportion of independent board members. The coefficient on Hedger for this sample 
during the pre-crisis period is -1.517. This result implies that firms with higher quality of 
corporate governance practices are penalized for the use of financial derivatives, a result 
that is in line with Huang et al. (2009). The reasoning behind this may be that the 
increased transparency from hedging is more useful in firms with lower protection for 
investors. However, during the crisis period, opposite results are observed, in that firms 
with above-median proportion of independent board member have a higher positive 
coefficient on Hedger that is statistically significant at the 1 % level. This may be in line 
with the logic that well-governed firms are expected to use financial derivatives 
effectively and for hedging purposes only, reducing the overall cost of risk management 
activities over time.  
 
Another interesting finding is the observed negative relationship between the absolute 
amount of discretionary accruals and firm performance for the firms with below-median 
independent boards. This result is consistent with the proposition of Huang et al. (2009), 
suggesting that firms where board members have control on management practices, 
artificial income smoothing has lower negative impacts, whereas firms that are more 
vulnerable to agency conflicts suffer higher consequences of reducing the quality of 
reported earnings via discretionary accruals.  
Taking into consideration these results, Hypothesis 6 can be partially accepted, due to the 
proposed higher negative impact of artificial found on firm performance for firms with 
lower quality of corporate governance during the crisis period, but lower hedging 
premium observed for firms with higher quality corporate governance.  
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Table 13. Hedging, Discretionary Accruals, and Firm Performance - Firms with below-
median and above-median proportion of independent board members 
 
 Before Crisis Crisis Period  Whole Period 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stock Returns Below median Above median Below median Above median Below median Above median 
              
Constant -30.027** -32.694 151.523 114.761** 8.324 51.114*** 
 (-2.471) (-1.594) (1.365) (2.468) (0.625) (3.454) 
Hedger 0.424 -1.517*** 0.527 7.083*** 1.140** 1.429 
 (0.906) (-3.456) (0.609) (4.320) (2.436) (1.548) 
D. Accruals 4.103 -0.905 -20.177*** -5.882 -3.916 -0.125 
 (0.829) (-0.165) (-3.090) (-0.527) (-0.895) (-0.031) 
Ln(assets) 1.866** 2.136* -10.002 -7.463** -0.569 -3.169*** 
 (2.577) (1.695) (-1.445) (-2.538) (-0.677) (-3.380) 
Return on Assets 0.019 0.055 0.024 0.045 0.046 0.091** 
 (0.326) (1.164) (0.274) (0.529) (1.066) (2.165) 
Leverage -0.270*** -0.057 -0.151*** -0.290*** -0.130*** -0.133** 
 (-13.052) (-1.227) (-6.663) (-3.016) (-4.120) (-2.403) 
Foreign Sales 0.026 0.053* 0.169 0.069 0.005 0.026 
 (1.066) (1.708) (1.494) (0.975) (0.187) (1.158) 
Capex-to-Sales -2.085 -2.248 2.151 -20.940* 2.360 -10.304** 
 (-0.512) (-0.924) (1.593) (-1.850) (0.748) (-2.600) 
Dividend Payer -0.238 -2.062 -2.881*** -7.618 -0.044 -1.932 
 (-0.137) (-0.952) (-3.512) (-1.642) (-0.034) (-1.123) 
       
Observations 361 297 175 273 536 570 
R-squared 0.196 0.173 0.752 0.733 0.590 0.580 
Number of firms 195 162 115 167 212 200 
*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. Robust t-stats reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
5.4. Potential Impacts of Endogeneity 
 
This study uses Pooled OLS as well as Firm Fixed-effects regression methodology to 
identify the impact of artificial and real income smoothing on firm performance. Based 
on Bartlett & Partnoy (2018), fixed-effects model provides more reliable results in studies 
using a dependent measure based on stock returns since it avoids the influence of firm-
specific factors on the relationship between other independent variables and the 
dependent variable. However, studies in the field of risk management practices and their 
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impact on firm performance are vulnerable to endogeneity bias due to the potential 
influence of a wide variety of unobserved and observed factors, whether micro-economic 
or macro-economic, as well as the probability of reverse causality. In order to avoid 
endogeneity bias, Huang et al. use a two-state simultaneous equations model. Finding an 
appropriate instrumental variable is challenging, with a sub-optimal instrumental variable 
leading to significantly biased results. On the other hand, Bartram et al. (2011) use a 
propensity score matching method to reduce the impact of endogeneity in the regressions 
using a large sample of non-financial firms from 47 countries. Due to a relatively small 
sample of approx. 297 individual firms, propensity scoring technique could not be used 
in the study. Therefore, despite of having moderately sized sample and using a panel data 
structure concerning 5 annual periods, the results presented in the previous chapter may 
be affected by endogeneity bias.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Along with the development of financial markets in the United States, the use of financial 
derivatives has also increased. Various studies on the impact of hedging financial risk 
using derivatives report a statistically significant relationship between the two. However, 
whether hedging has a positive or a negative impact on firm performance is observed to 
be dependent on various factors based on the mixed results (Allayannis & Weston 2001; 
Jin & Jorion 2006). On the other hand, artificial income smoothing has been shown to 
affect firm performance negatively (Tang and Chang 2014). In addition, previous 
literature suggests a relationship between artificial income smoothing using discretionary 
accruals and real income smoothing.  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to identify the impact of income smoothing on firm 
performance. This study uses a sample of 297 non-financial firms listed on the S&P 500 
index in the United States of America during 2005-2009. It extends the existing literature 
in three key ways - by using a novel measure of firm performance - compounded monthly 
stock returns as a measure of firm performance, employing measures of artificial and real 
income smoothing together, and providing a comparison of results between an 
economically stable period (2005-2007) and a period of economic and financial 
uncertainty (2008-2009). Further, the role of corporate governance is explored by 
segregating the sample into two categories based on the quality of corporate governance, 
measured by the proportion of independent board members in a firm. While real income 
smoothing is measure by a binary variable indicating whether a firm used financial 
derivatives in a given year or not, artificial income smoothing is measure by the absolute 
amount of discretionary accruals during the year. In addition to the correlation and 
univariate analyses, multi-variate regression analysis is performed using Pooled OLS and 
Firm-Fixed-effects model with robust standard errors. Control variables concerning firm 
size, profitability, capital structure, geographical diversification, dividend policy, etc. are 
included in all regressions to avoid biased results.  
 
Results from the various analyses discussed in earlier chapters provide support for the 
hypothesis that income smoothing has a statistically significant impact on firm 
78 
 
performance and allows for the rejection of the null hypotheses of no significant impact 
of the real and artificial income smoothing devices on the measure of firm performance. 
However, the impact of income smoothing is only observed for the period representing 
the global financial crisis. Specifically, using financial derivatives has a positive impact 
on compounded monthly stock return, whereas the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
has a negative effect on compounded monthly stock return during the period 2008-2009, 
but not during the period leading up to the crisis (2005-2007). These relationships are 
found to be stronger for firms that are relatively larger in size, consistent with the theory 
that large firms have reduced costs of setting up risk management practices due to 
economies of scale, but scrutinized more for reporting lower-quality earnings. Further, 
firms with more independent boards are found to experience negative consequences of 
using financial derivatives during the pre-crisis period, but found to derive positive 
market value from the same during the crisis period. On the other hand, firms with less 
independent boards suffer more severe negative consequences of using artificial income 
smoothing devices during the crisis period. These results suggest a change in investor 
perception of income smoothing techniques during different economic cycles.  
 
Although the findings of this study may potentially suffer from endogeneity bias, which 
is widely reported to be present in similar research in the past, they are of high academic 
and practical significance. The results suggest that the influence of artificial and real 
income smoothing on firm performance is dependent on various factors, including the 
time-period of the data, relative size of the sample firms, corporate governance practices, 
as well as the measure of firm performance and income smoothing being used. 
Corporations may derive market value from employing the suitable income smoothing 
technique and thereby increasing investor confidence. Further research on the subject is 
recommended to use a larger sample of firms from different countries as well as a longer 
sample period with several economic cycles, allowing for more sophisticated quantitative 
analysis methodologies to be used. 
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